A synthesis note from the Public Asset and PPP Lab (ISVD-LAB-005). It places two schemes side by side and reads the positions that do not run the work through a shared set of markers. The individual analyses are in The two seats PFS sets aside for supporters（このサイトの記事） and The scheme where programme officers are invisible（このサイトの記事）.
The dormant deposits scheme and pay-for-success differ in their source of funds, their ministry and their purpose. One channels the public's dormant bank balances into public-interest activity; the other is a contracting method under which a local government pays according to results.
They nonetheless share a shape. Both set aside several positions for parties that do not run the work themselves.
In the dormant deposits scheme, fund distribution organizations select and fund implementing organizations, activity support organizations provide support without money, and programme officers deliver hands-on support. In pay-for-success, intermediary support organisations shape projects, funders provide capital, and third-party evaluators assess results.
All of these are supporter's seats. What happens once you sit in one, however, differs sharply. Deciding which to aim for means laying them side by side.
The three markers
Nine seats, set against three questions.
- Does money move? If you take this seat, who pays whom, and under what heading
- Do you carry risk? If results do not come, what of yours is reduced
- Is the seat counted? Can the number of bodies or people in it be read off the scheme's published material
| Seat | Money moves | Carries risk | Is counted | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dormant deposits | Fund distribution organization | ○ | △ | ○ | Published |
| Dormant deposits | Implementing organization | ○ | ○ | ○ | Published |
| Dormant deposits | Activity support organization | ○ | △ | ○ | 15 bodies |
| Dormant deposits | Supported organization | × | × | ○ | 50 bodies |
| Dormant deposits | Programme officer | ○ | × | × | Not published |
| PFS | Contractor | ○ | ○ | ○ | 379 projects |
| PFS | Funder | △ | ○ | ○ | 19 projects |
| PFS | Intermediary support organisation | ○ | × | × | Not published |
| PFS | Third-party evaluator | ○ | × | × | Not published |
What the intersection shows
Comparing the three columns produces one finding.
All three uncounted seats are seats that carry no risk. The dormant deposits programme officer, the PFS intermediary support organisation, and the PFS third-party evaluator. For these three, no route exists to a number in published material.
The reverse holds too. Of the six that are counted, only the supported organization carries no risk. Because no money reaches it either, no financial accountability arises in the first place. It is still counted, which can be read as a consequence of activity support organizations having to report it as a result.
In other words, schemes count those who carry risk and do not count those who do not. Risk appears to be the unit of accountability. The dormant deposits call guidelines introduce disclosure of assessment results by saying that, in view of the funds being the assets of the people, accountability to the people must be fulfilled, and then list applicant names, documents, process, reasons and grant amounts. The axis of disclosure sits on the flow of money and the judgement behind it.
There is nothing wrong with that design in itself. A scheme handling public money should make the flow and its responsibility traceable.
The problem lies in the consequence.
The synthesis hypothesis
Under this design, organisations whose core business is supporting others end up in the least visible position.
Such organisations usually carry no risk. Payment for hands-on support is a fee for services, not money to be returned if results do not come. So they are not counted. And because they are not counted, there is no way from outside the scheme to check whether the profession is growing.
The order is inverted here. Schemes are trying to grow the supporting side. The dormant deposits scheme created the activity support window and gave programme officers a dedicated cost category and a training requirement. The pay-for-success action plan calls for building a network among local governments, private operators, financial institutions, universities and intermediary support organisations. The design for growing them exists; the indicator for whether they have grown does not.
In the three-year count of the activity support tier（このサイトの記事）, all eleven successful applications were submitted as programmes that support other organisations. The window works as a window for organisations that can design support. How many practitioners it has produced appears in no document.
How to use it
When deciding which seat to aim for, the three markers work like this.
| Question | Marker | Judgement |
|---|---|---|
| Do you need funds for the work | Does money move | A seat where it does not is not a fundraising route |
| What do you lose if it fails | Do you carry risk | A seat that carries risk needs a balance sheet behind it |
| Can you show it as a track record | Is it counted | An uncounted seat is hard to cite in the next proposal |
The third is the one most often missed. Experience in an uncounted seat leaves no trace unless you record it yourself. Since it does not appear in published material, presenting it as a track record later requires your own record of the project name, the period and the scope of your involvement.
If you are taking a supporter's seat, count what the scheme will not count for you. That is the practical conclusion the three markers lead to.
Open questions
First, can an indicator be built for seats that carry no risk? AMED, having set rules under the act on disclosure of information held by incorporated administrative agencies, lists the names, affiliations and titles of programme officers on each programme page. At a level short of personal contact details, there is a range that can be published without harming individual rights. Even numbers and fields would let the depth of the profession be checked from outside.
Second, how is independence secured when an intermediary also evaluates? The common guidelines call a third-party evaluator desirable while allowing the intermediary to take on the evaluation role. A design in which two uncounted seats overlap in one organisation fits inside that wording.
Third, does the shape hold in other schemes? Only two schemes and nine seats are laid out here. Subsidies, designated management, and Park-PFI all contain supporter positions. Whether the same shape appears under the same three markers is the next thing to test.
Related research notes
- The two seats PFS sets aside for supporters（このサイトの記事）. Positions that provide no service
- Pricing what cannot be measured（このサイトの記事）. Building a willingness to pay
- Has PFS reached beyond the three priority fields（このサイトの記事）. Field expansion and first-time adopters
Related columns and guides
- The scheme where programme officers are invisible（このサイトの記事）. Organisations and money are published; people are not
- Three years of the activity support tier（このサイトの記事）. Who the eleven winners were
- Five ways into the dormant deposits scheme（このサイトの記事）. Where you apply changes everything
References
FY2026 Fund Distribution Organization (Grant) General Round 1 Call Guidelines — Japan Network for Public Interest Activities (JANPIA) (2026)
Common Guidelines on Pay-for-Success Contracting (revised February 2024) — Cabinet Office (2024)
Status of PFS Projects in Japan — Cabinet Office (2026)
On the Dormant Deposits Utilization Scheme — Cabinet Office (2026)
Information Prescribed in Article 22 of the Act on Access to Information Held by Incorporated Administrative Agencies — Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED) (2026)