Neighborhood Ethnic Restaurants Are Disappearing — The ¥30 Million Capital Requirement for Business Manager Visas Tests Japan's Commitment to Multiculturalism
In October 2025, the capital requirement for the Business Manager visa was raised sixfold, from ¥5 million to ¥30 million. Approximately 96% of current visa holders fall short of this new threshold. Simultaneously, the Specified Skilled Worker category for the food service industry was suspended. This article examines the structural policy design that is causing Indian curry restaurants, Thai eateries, and Hong Kong-style congee shops to disappear from Japan's streets.
TL;DR
- The capital requirement for the Business Manager visa increased sixfold from ¥5 million to ¥30 million, leaving 96% of current holders below the new standard
- Simultaneously, the Specified Skilled Worker (Food Service) quota reached its ceiling, suspending new admissions — a double blow to the sector
- The regulatory overhaul targeting shell companies strikes legitimate small-scale entrepreneurs, revealing a fundamental contradiction in policy design
What Is Happening
The sixfold increase in the Business Manager visa capital requirement, combined with the suspension of Specified Skilled Worker (Food Service) admissions, has pushed foreign-owned restaurants to the brink of closure
Familiar flavors are disappearing from neighborhood streets.
The ministerial ordinance revision by the Immigration Services Agency of Japan, which took effect on October 16, 2025, substantially tightened the requirements for the "Business Manager" residence status — the visa that allows foreign nationals to operate a company in Japan. The most significant change is the increase in the capital requirement. The threshold was raised from ¥5 million to ¥30 million — a sixfold increase.
| Requirement | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Capital | ¥5M+ | ¥30M+ |
| Full-time staff | 2+ (or ¥5M capital) | 1+ (mandatory) |
| Japanese | None | JLPT N2 |
| Education | None | Master's or 3yr exp. |
* Transitional period: Existing residents have until Oct. 16, 2028. ~96% of current visa holders fall below the new threshold (Inshokuten.com).
In addition, the employment of at least one full-time employee became mandatory (previously, applicants could choose between "¥5 million or more in capital" or "two or more full-time employees"). New requirements were also introduced for Japanese language proficiency equivalent to JLPT N2, as well as a business-related master's degree or at least three years of practical experience. In effect, this constitutes a quadruple barrier.
The revision directly targets small foreign-owned restaurants. Only about 4% of Business Manager visa holders operate companies with capital of ¥30 million or more. Approximately 70% operate with capital in the ¥5–6 million range. In other words, the overwhelming majority of current Business Manager visa holders do not meet the new standard.
The hashtag "#SupportOurFavoriteEthnicRestaurants" spread rapidly on social media, and a Change.org petition calling for the repeal of the ordinance revision surpassed 10,000 signatures within a week.
A separate policy change compounded the pressure in April 2026. The issuance of Certificates of Eligibility for Specified Skilled Worker Type 1 in the food service sector was suspended. The number of residents in this category reached approximately 46,000 as of the end of February 2026, approaching the five-year cap of 50,000. Pathways to Japan are now closing simultaneously — both for foreign nationals seeking to operate businesses and for those seeking to work in them.
Background and Context
Introduced as a countermeasure against shell company abuse, the stricter criteria are structured in a way that disproportionately harms legitimate small-scale operators
Why ¥30 Million?
The Immigration Services Agency of Japan tightened the requirements in direct response to the shell company problem. An investigation by the Tokyo Regional Immigration Bureau examined approximately 300 Business Manager visa cases flagged as suspicious between September and December 2023, finding that business substance could not be confirmed in approximately 90% of them. The use of name-lending arrangements and nominally incorporated entities to maintain residence status had become widespread.
The number of Business Manager visa holders reached approximately 41,000 in 2024, an increase of roughly 1.5 times over the preceding five years. This rapid growth heightened concerns about the shell company problem.
The ¥30 million threshold can be read as a form of "price-setting" designed to make shell company arrangements economically unviable. While ¥5 million could be procured through intermediaries, ¥30 million exceeds the cost-benefit threshold for most shell company operations — or so the policy judgment runs.
Collateral Damage to Legitimate Entrepreneurs
The problem is that this countermeasure is structured to strike not only "bad-faith actors" but also "good-faith small-scale entrepreneurs."
Indian curry, Nepalese cuisine, Thai food, Vietnamese dishes, Chinese fare — the ethnic restaurants that have enriched Japan's culinary landscape are, in many cases, micro-enterprises with capital of ¥5–6 million and a handful of employees. Restaurant owners who have built loyal customer bases through their cooking and character, and who have put down roots in their communities, are now being confronted with a stark choice: raise ¥30 million or shut down and go home.
A three-year transitional period (until October 16, 2028) has been granted to operators who were already residing in Japan before the effective date. But for most small restaurant owners, a realistic pathway to increasing their capital sixfold within three years simply does not exist.
Headwinds Facing the Restaurant Industry
This is not a problem confined to foreign-owned operators. The restaurant industry as a whole faces an unprecedented convergence of adverse conditions. The number of restaurant bankruptcies in 2024 reached 894, the highest on record. Rising prices, minimum wage increases, and labor shortages form a triple burden, compounded by the repayment pressure from zero-interest, zero-collateral COVID-era loans.
Within this industry environment, a demand to "increase your capital sixfold" amounts, in practical terms, to a forced exit for foreign operators.
Reading the Structure
An internal contradiction in Japan's policy design — professing "multicultural coexistence" while systematically excluding foreign nationals from operating businesses
What this issue reveals is an internal contradiction within Japan's "multicultural coexistence" policy.
On one hand, the government espouses "promoting the contributions of foreign human resources" and "realizing a multicultural coexistence society." Municipal international relations departments are expanding multilingual services, and culinary experiences for inbound tourists are positioned as a pillar of tourism strategy. On the other hand, the institutional framework is making it systematically more difficult for foreign nationals to establish themselves as business owners within Japanese society.
A comparison with the U.S. E-2 visa sharpens the structural contrast. The E-2 visa specifies no fixed minimum investment amount; rather, a "substantial" investment proportional to the scale of the enterprise is required. Even a small restaurant can be assessed on the soundness of its business plan. Spouses are also permitted to work. Where Japan's new system cuts with a fixed absolute capital threshold, the E-2 retains the flexibility to evaluate the substantive merits of a business.
The fundamental question is this: Is culinary diversity something to "leave to market forces," or is it "a public good worth protecting"?
Just as Parisian food culture has been shaped not only by French cuisine but also by North African and Vietnamese influences, Tokyo's culinary landscape has been built up layer by layer by Nepalese curry, Sichuan mala dishes, and Thai street food. Many of the people who created that landscape are foreign-owned restaurant operators who started with ¥5 million in capital. The "culinary homogenization" that follows their departure is a loss that is difficult to quantify but will nonetheless occur.
The objective of combating shell companies is legitimate. But a design that "excludes good-faith entrepreneurs in order to exclude bad actors" reflects a disproportionality between ends and means. An institutional framework that evaluates not the absolute amount of capital but the operational substance of a business — revenue, employment, tax records, years of operation in the community — is not technically impossible to implement. The fact that the Immigration Bureau was able to investigate 300 cases and determine that approximately 90% lacked operational substance means the agency already possesses the capacity to distinguish real businesses from fictitious ones.
What is at stake now is the design of the gateway that determines who Japan permits to operate a business — and whether that design is fair.
Related Columns
- The Structural Contradictions of Japan's Technical Intern Training Program — The Gap Between "Human Resource Development" and Cheap Labor
- Designing Immigration Policy and Pathways for Skilled Workers
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References
在留資格「経営・管理」の上陸基準省令の改正について — 出入国在留管理庁. Ministry of Justice
政府、外国人の「経営ビザ」要件を厳格化 資本金500万円→3000万円に — 日本経済新聞. Nikkei Shimbun
エスニック料理店が激減する？ビザ厳格化で資本金3000万円が条件に…外国人店主「やっていけない」 — 東京新聞. Tokyo Shimbun
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特定技能・外食で受け入れ停止 上限規制、外国人依存の実態とズレも — 日本経済新聞. Nikkei Shimbun
経営管理ビザの要件はどう変わった？ 2026年最新の3,000万円基準と飲食店が取るべき対策 — 飲食店ドットコム. Inshokuten.com
