Structural Problems in Agriculture and Food Security——Reading the Meaning of 38% Self-Sufficiency

38% on a calorie basis. This figure alone does not reveal the contours of the crisis facing Japanese agriculture.

When low self-sufficiency rates are discussed, import dependency and trade structures are often placed at the center of debate. But the roots of the problem run deeper. The fact is that the domestic agricultural production base itself is quietly but steadily collapsing.

Statistics from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) show that core agricultural workers in individual farm households fell from 1.363 million in 2020 to 1.036 million in 2025 and 987,000 in 2026[1]. Of the 2025 total, 721,000 were aged 65 or over, and the average age was 67.7[1] — more than two in three are 65 or older. To put it succinctly: simultaneous aging and contraction. Japan's agricultural workforce structure has already reached "unsustainable" territory.

The pace of entry and exit

New entrants to farming numbered 43,500 in 2024, down from just over 60,000 in 2016[1]. Departures outpace them, so the agricultural workforce keeps falling on net. Abandoned farmland stood at 257,000 hectares at the end of FY2024, of which 159,000 hectares are judged difficult to bring back into use[2]. Restoring once-degraded farmland to a productive state requires enormous cost and time. Lost farmland can become effectively irreversible losses.

Agricultural Policy Turning Point——The Merits and Demerits of Rice Reduction Policies

Postwar Japanese agricultural policy has been built around rice as its foundation. The rice reduction policy (production adjustment) introduced in 1970 was designed to curb rice overproduction, but resulted in idling of paddy fields while failing to adequately promote transition to alternative crops. Although administrative allocation of rice reduction was abolished in 2018, production adjustment practices continue in effect, with policy changes not translating into behavioral changes at the field level.

The frame of an industry to be protected

The core problem lies in the entrenchment of a policy framework that positioned agriculture as a "declining industry requiring protection." Direct payments to farmers, price supports, and tariff protection——while these measures temporarily supported individual farmers, they simultaneously delayed structural reforms. Farm scale expansion and corporatization lagged, leaving agricultural productivity low among developed nations.

What Agricultural Aging Means

The aging of agricultural workers is not simply a matter of "young people not wanting to farm." Many elderly farmers operate small-scale family businesses with no connection to farm corporatization or scaling up. When these farmers leave agriculture, farmland faces a binary choice: becoming abandoned due to lack of successors, or being consolidated with regional leaders.

The Farmland Bank (Agricultural Land Intermediate Management Organization), established in 2014, has promoted farmland consolidation. The farmland consolidation rate to core farmers reached approximately 60%[3] as of 2023. However, in disadvantaged areas——terraced rice fields and slopes in hilly and mountainous regions——there are simply no willing recipients. Efficient consolidation proceeds on flat farmland while disadvantaged areas face abandonment without successors. Agricultural land "polarization" is expanding.

Climate Change and Domestic Production Risks

Climate change compounds agricultural structural problems. MAFF estimates that without adaptation measures, rice yields could decrease by up to 30% by 2050. Heat damage causing immature white grains is already evident primarily in Niigata and Hokuriku regions, with some areas experiencing significant drops in first-grade rice ratios in 2023.

For fruit trees, production areas are moving northward, with apple growing zones shifting from traditional Aomori and Nagano prefectures to Hokkaido. In livestock, heat stress is causing reduced milk production and breeding performance problems. Weakening domestic production bases further accelerates import dependency.

This problem should not be reduced to numerical target discussions of "how to raise self-sufficiency rates."

The Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas Basic Act, revised in 2024, drew attention as the first major revision in 25 years. The 2030 target for calorie-based self-sufficiency is 45%. But this figure was carried over from the previous basic plan and has never been achieved in over 20 years. Repeating target values only deepens doubts about policy effectiveness.

The chain of structural problems

Let me reorganize the chain of structural problems. Aging and declining workforce creates abandoned farmland, shrinking agricultural land reduces domestic production capacity, and imports fill the gap. This cycle has continued for over 40 years, resulting in the 38% figure.

Not market failure but policy outcome

Notable is that this structure represents "policy outcomes" rather than "market failure." Supply-demand management agricultural policies typified by rice price maintenance and production reduction protected farmers while undermining agricultural competitiveness and next-generation participation incentives. Moves to reposition agriculture in national security contexts were partially reflected in the basic law revision, but specific measures——investment in core farmers, smart agriculture promotion support, strategic decisions on maintaining or consolidating disadvantaged areas——are still in early stages.

Perspectives viewing food security from global supply chain vulnerabilities（このサイトの記事） and from domestic agricultural structures are two sides of the same coin. When imports are disrupted, how much food can be produced domestically? This "emergency production capacity" is determined by maintaining and investing in agricultural infrastructure during peacetime.

38 percent is the result of choices

The 38% figure represents both the result of half a century of policy choices and something that can be changed through future choices. However, the reality that the average age of core farmers is 67.7 years underscores the shortness of remaining time.

Related Columns

• The Structure of 38% Food Self-Sufficiency: "Food Security" in the Globalization Era（このサイトの記事）
• The Intersection of Climate Change and Social Inequality（このサイトの記事）
• Reading the Structure of Local Government "Extinction"（このサイトの記事）

References

農業構造動態調査結果の概要（令和7年） — 農林水産省 (2025). Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (農林水産省)

令和6年度食料自給率・食料自給力指標について — 農林水産省 (2025). Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (農林水産省)

食料・農業・農村基本法の一部を改正する法律（令和6年法律第52号） — 農林水産省 (2024). Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (農林水産省)

Japan's Farming Population Rapidly Aging and Decreasing — Nippon.com (2025). Nippon.com

Recommended Reading

食の戦争 (Food Wars (Shoku no Sensou))

Nobuhiro Suzuki (2013)

Analyzes the structural crisis of Japan's food security through the lens of agricultural policy and trade negotiations, including the inside story of TPP talks.

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