U.S.–Israeli Military Strikes on Iran — Implications for Energy Security and Civil Society
From the Twelve-Day War of June 2025 to the large-scale strikes of February 2026. This analysis examines the structural vulnerabilities in energy security facing Japan—a nation 96% dependent on Middle Eastern crude oil—and the questions that military action poses for civil society.
What Is Happening
On February 28, 2026, the United States launched Operation Epic Fury and Israel simultaneously initiated Operation Roaring Lion—large-scale military campaigns targeting Tehran, Isfahan, Qom, Karaj, and Kermanshah. Approximately 2,000 strikes were carried out over 48 hours. Preliminary casualty figures indicate 787 Iranian deaths (of which 555 were civilians), 11 Israeli fatalities, 6 U.S. service members, and 8 deaths among Gulf state nationals. Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei was confirmed dead around March 1 by Iranian state media.
These strikes did not emerge in a vacuum. From June 13 to 24, 2025, Israel conducted the "Twelve-Day War," striking approximately 100 targets including Iranian nuclear facilities. On June 22, the United States launched Operation Midnight Hammer, deploying seven B-2 bombers against the nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan—marking the first operational use of the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator. In response, Iran formally withdrew from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) on October 18, 2025, unilaterally abandoning all constraints on its nuclear program.
On December 28, 2025, anti-regime protests erupted across Iran on a scale unseen since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The demonstrations spread to over 100 cities; regime crackdowns reportedly killed between 3,117 and as many as 32,000 people—a range that itself reflects the severity of information suppression. On February 3, 2026, IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) naval forces attempted and failed to seize a U.S. tanker in the Strait of Hormuz. This chain of military escalation culminated in the large-scale strikes at the end of February.
The humanitarian toll has been severe. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk stated that strikes on civilians and civilian infrastructure may constitute war crimes. Approximately 30,000 new internally displaced persons were generated within 48 hours, adding to an existing population of 64,000 IDPs. A strike on an elementary school in Minab, southern Iran, killed and injured numerous young girls. Under the rubric of "precision strikes" against military installations, civilian casualties have continued to accumulate.
Background and Context
Understanding this military conflict requires attention to the structure of energy security. Japan's dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil reached a historic high of 95–96.6% as of 2025. Approximately 75% of the country's oil imports transit the Strait of Hormuz. The breakdown by source country is Saudi Arabia at approximately 44%, the UAE at approximately 41%, and Kuwait at approximately 7.8%. For Japan, military conflict in the Middle East is not a distant war—it is a direct threat to the foundations of daily life.
The impact on crude oil prices has already materialized. Brent crude stood at approximately $73 per barrel before the strikes and rose roughly 13% to $82 afterward. Estimates for a partial supply disruption scenario project $100 per barrel. In a worst-case scenario involving complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz, prices could reach $200—a level surpassing the 1973 oil crisis. Goldman Sachs estimates that a six-week strait closure would raise inflation across Asia by 0.7 percentage points. Japan's electricity futures also hit record highs, with the FY2026 Tokyo baseload reaching 13.58 yen/kWh, an 11% surge.
Japan maintains strategic petroleum reserves (戦略石油備蓄) sufficient for approximately 240 days. On the surface, this appears to provide a reasonable buffer. Yet during the 1973 oil crisis, although the OAPEC oil embargo was lifted after just five months, the Japanese economy sustained severe damage. The volume of reserves and the societal disruption caused by supply interruption are separate problems. Even with 240 days of reserves, the effects of price surges immediately propagate to electricity rates, transportation costs, and food prices. Japan's energy structure contains vulnerabilities that cannot be measured by reserve volume alone.
Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae condemned Iran's nuclear development as "absolutely unacceptable." However, she issued neither explicit support for nor criticism of the U.S.–Israeli military operations. This ambiguity reflects a longstanding dilemma in Japanese diplomacy: obligations to the United States as an alliance partner, the imperative to maintain relations with Middle Eastern oil-producing states, and the pacifism enshrined in the constitution. During the 1973 oil crisis, Japan diverged from U.S. policy by adopting a pro-Arab stance, thereby avoiding the oil embargo. In 2019, Prime Minister Abe visited Tehran in an attempt to mediate between the United States and Iran. The current situation poses the question of whether this half-century-old balancing act remains viable—or has reached its limits.
Structural Reading / Seeds for Social Vision
Three structural layers emerge from this crisis.
The first is the re-exposure of the "single-point-of-failure risk" in energy dependence. Japan's 96% reliance on Middle Eastern crude oil is an extraordinarily high figure given a half-century of energy diversification policy. Nuclear power was promoted after the 1973 oil crisis; renewable energy gained attention after the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster—and yet Middle Eastern dependence has reached an all-time high. This is less a failure of individual energy policies than a demonstration of how profoundly difficult structural transition to alternative energy sources remains. Energy security cannot be resolved through technical arguments alone. It is a problem of social design (社会設計) in which international relations, domestic politics, industrial structure, and consumption behavior are all intertwined.
The second is the myth of "precision strikes" and the structural inevitability of civilian harm. In 48 hours, approximately 2,000 strikes killed 787 people, of whom 555 were civilians—roughly 70% of total fatalities. This figure contradicts the narrative of "limited strikes on military facilities using precision-guided munitions." The attack on an elementary school is emblematic. Regardless of advances in modern military technology, it is structurally impossible to avoid civilian casualties in large-scale operations against densely populated areas. Any discussion of the legitimacy of military action that averts its gaze from this reality is incomplete. The gravity of the UN High Commissioner's reference to possible war crimes demands direct confrontation.
The third is the interaction between domestic regime instability and external military intervention. The anti-regime protests of December 2025 represented an endogenous impulse for change within Iranian civil society. Protest movements spanning more than 100 cities constituted an effort by citizens to challenge the existing order through their own agency. External military strikes, however, complicate such internally driven social transformation. As history has repeatedly demonstrated, external military threats provide authoritarian regimes with a pretext for consolidating power and contracting the space available to civil society. The reported death toll of 3,117 to 32,000 in the crackdown on demonstrations starkly illustrates the structural dynamic whereby regimes justify violence by invoking external threats. Even if military intervention achieves "regime change," the resulting society may prove more fragile if the process erodes civil society's autonomous capacity for transformation.
From the perspective of social vision (社会構想), the essential question is: whose security, and security against what, does military action achieve? Even if the destruction of nuclear facilities degrades Iran's nuclear capability, 30,000 newly displaced persons, destroyed civilian infrastructure, and lost civilian lives cannot be restored. A framework that conceives of security solely in terms of interstate military balance structurally renders invisible the citizens who bear its costs. What Japan should learn from this crisis extends beyond the practical task of diversifying energy supply. It encompasses the ethical imperative of squarely confronting the human costs of military force within the context of the nation's own energy security.
Remaining Questions
Japan's 96% dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil means that the foundations of national life are entrusted to a waterway merely 33 kilometers wide—the Strait of Hormuz. The issue is not that 240 days of reserves provide adequate protection; rather, the very fact that 240 days of reserves are deemed necessary reveals the fragility of the underlying structure. 555 civilian deaths, a strike on an elementary school, 30,000 displaced persons—these figures describe a reality unfolding in the same region from which Japan imports its oil. The stable supply of energy and human security are not separate policy challenges. They are two sides of the same structure. With this structure squarely in view, what energy policy and diplomatic posture should Japan choose? After half a century, this dilemma remains unresolved.
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References
Energy White Paper 2025
Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)
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Oil Market Report
International Energy Agency (IEA). IEA
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Statement on Civilian Harm in Iran
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. OHCHR
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