US-Israeli Attacks on Iran — Ripple Effects on Energy Security and Civil Society

On February 28, 2026, the United States launched a large-scale military operation called Operation Epic Fury, while Israel simultaneously began Operation Roaring Lion. The attack targets included Tehran, Isfahan, Qom, Karaj, and Kermanshah. Approximately 2,000 attacks were carried out within 48 hours. Provisional casualties stand at 787 Iranian deaths (including 555 civilians), 11 Israeli deaths, 6 US servicemembers, and 8 people from Gulf states. Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei was confirmed dead around March 1st by Iranian state media.

These attacks did not begin suddenly. They were preceded by the "Twelve-Day War" from June 13-24, 2025, when Israel attacked approximately 100 Iranian sites including nuclear facilities. On June 22, the US launched Operation Midnight Hammer, deploying seven B-2 bombers to attack nuclear facilities in Fordo, Natanz, and Isfahan. This marked the first combat use of GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs. In response, Iran formally withdrew from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) on October 18, 2025, voluntarily abandoning constraints on its nuclear development.

On December 28, 2025, anti-government demonstrations erupted across Iran, representing the largest scale protests since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The protests spread to over 100 cities, and regime crackdowns resulted in an estimated 3,117 to 32,000 deaths. The wide range in casualty figures reflects the severity of information control. On February 3, 2026, the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) Navy unsuccessfully attempted to seize a US tanker in the Strait of Hormuz. This chain of military escalation led to the large-scale attacks at the end of February.

The humanitarian toll has been severe. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Türk noted that attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure could constitute war crimes. The 48-hour period generated approximately 30,000 new displaced persons, adding to the existing 64,000 internally displaced persons. An attack on an elementary school in Minab in southern Iran resulted in numerous casualties among schoolgirls. Under the pretext of "precision strikes" on military facilities, civilian casualties continue to mount.

96%Middle East crude oil dependency (historic high)

Saudi Arabia (44%)

UAE (41%)

Kuwait (7.8%)

Other Middle East (3.8%)

Non-Middle East (3.4%)

Understanding this military conflict requires examining energy security structures. Japan's dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil reached a historic high of 95-96.6% as of 2025. Approximately 75% of oil imports transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Import sources break down as follows: Saudi Arabia approximately 44%, UAE approximately 41%, Kuwait approximately 7.8%. Military conflicts in the Middle East are not "distant wars" for Japan but situations directly linked to the foundation of daily life.

Pre-attackBaseline

$73

Post-attack+13% increase

$82

Partial disruptionPartial supply cutoff

$100

Strait blockadeWorst-case scenario

$200

Impact on oil prices has already materialized. Brent crude oil prices rose approximately 13% from about $73/barrel before the attacks to $82 after. Scenarios involving partial supply disruption project prices reaching $100. In the worst-case scenario of complete Strait of Hormuz closure, prices could reach up to $200, surpassing levels seen during the 1973 oil crisis. Goldman Sachs estimates that a six-week strait closure would increase inflation rates across Asia by 0.7 percentage points. Japan's electricity futures also hit record highs, with FY2026 Tokyo baseload reaching 13.58 yen/kWh, representing an 11% surge.

Japan maintains strategic petroleum reserves equivalent to approximately 240 days of consumption. The numbers alone suggest a degree of cushion. However, during the 1973 oil crisis, despite OAPEC's oil embargo being lifted in just five months, the Japanese economy suffered severe damage. Reserve quantities and social disruption during supply interruptions are separate issues. Even with 240 days of reserves, the effects of price surges immediately ripple through electricity rates, transportation costs, and food prices. Vulnerabilities that cannot be measured by reserve quantities are built into Japan's energy structure.

Prime Minister Takai Sanae condemned Iran's nuclear development as "absolutely unacceptable." However, she has expressed neither clear support nor condemnation of the US-Israeli military operations. This ambiguity reflects traditional dilemmas in Japanese diplomacy: obligations to ally United States, maintaining relationships with Middle Eastern oil-producing countries, and constitutional pacifism. During the 1973 oil crisis, Japan took a pro-Arab stance contrary to US policy and was thereby excluded from oil embargo targets. In 2019, Prime Minister Abe visited Tehran attempting to mediate between the US and Iran. The current situation questions whether this 50-year tradition of balanced diplomacy remains effective or has reached its limits.

I would like to examine the structural problems emerging from this situation across three layers.

First, the re-exposure of "concentration risk" in energy dependence. Japan's 96% dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil is excessively high as an outcome of half a century of energy diversification policies. After the 1973 oil crisis, nuclear power was promoted; after the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, renewable energy gained attention; yet Middle Eastern dependence has reached historic highs. This demonstrates not individual energy policy failures but how difficult structural transformation to alternative energy sources truly is. Energy security cannot be completed through technical discussions alone. It is a social design issue intertwining international relations, domestic politics, industrial structures, and consumption behaviors.

Second, the myth of "precision strikes" and the structural inevitability of civilian casualties. Of 787 deaths in 48 hours from approximately 2,000 attacks, 555 were civilians. The figure showing approximately 70% of all deaths being civilians contradicts explanations of "precision-guided weapons for limited attacks on military facilities." The attack on the elementary school symbolizes this reality. Regardless of advances in modern military technology, avoiding civilian casualties in large-scale attacks on densely populated areas is structurally impossible. We cannot discuss the merits of military action while turning away from this fact. The weight of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights' reference to possible war crimes must be confronted directly.

Third, the interaction between domestic regime instability and military intervention. The December 2025 anti-government demonstrations were seeds of change born from within Iranian civil society. The protest movement spreading to over 100 cities represented citizens' efforts to question the regime with their own hands. However, external military attacks complicate such endogenous social transformation movements. As history has repeatedly shown, external military threats provide pretexts for strengthening domestic authoritarian regimes and constricting civil society space. The death toll from demonstration crackdowns—ranging from 3,117 to 32,000—vividly illustrates structures where regimes justify violence using external threats. Even if military intervention brings about "regime change," if the autonomous transformative power of civil society is damaged in the process, post-intervention society may become more fragile.

From a Social Vision Design perspective, we must question whose safety and security from what threats is achieved through military means. Even if destroying nuclear facilities reduces Iran's nuclear development capabilities, the 30,000 newly displaced persons, destroyed civilian infrastructure, and lost civilian lives cannot be recovered. Viewing security solely as an issue of military balance between states structurally renders invisible the citizens who pay these costs. Japan must learn from this situation not only the practical task of diversifying energy supplies but also the ethical challenge of directly confronting the human costs of military force use within the context of our own energy security.

Japan's 96% dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil means entrusting the nation's livelihood foundation to the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway merely 33km wide. The issue is not that 240 days of reserves makes everything acceptable, but that needing 240 days of reserves itself indicates structural vulnerability. 555 civilian deaths, attacks on elementary schools, 30,000 displaced persons—these figures represent realities occurring in the same region from which Japan imports oil. Stable energy supply and human security are not separate policy issues. They are two sides of the same structure. Given this structure, what energy policies and diplomatic postures should Japan choose? We have yet to answer this 50-year dilemma.

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References

Energy White Paper 2025 — Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy

Oil Market Report — International Energy Agency (IEA). IEA

Statement on Civilian Harm in Iran — United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. OHCHR

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