Corrections
A record of errors found after publication and how we corrected them, including what we got wrong and why.
August 2026
Japan's Education Gift-Tax Exemption Is Gone: Reading the Structure Behind Educational Inequality
Updated the cumulative figures to the final numbers published by the Japan Trust Association, and moved the citation to the document that actually carries them.
- Before
- Approximately 255,450 contracts and ¥1.9155 trillion in trust assets as of September 2022. Average contribution per contract approximately ¥6.43 million; ¥7.07 million for trust bank contracts.
- After
- 283,760 contracts and ¥2.2033 trillion in trust assets as of March 2026. Dividing one by the other gives about ¥7.76 million per contract.
Why we got it wrong The URL we cited was a product description page and did not carry the figures. The numbers appear in Appendix 3 of the association's quarterly Trust Business Overview, which we now cite. The scheme closed at the end of March 2026, so the March 2026 figures are the final cumulative totals. The ¥6.43 million average had no source and could not be derived from the totals quoted in the same sentence (the old figures divide to about ¥7.50 million); it is now written so that readers can see it is a calculation.
Japan's Education Gift-Tax Exemption Is Gone: Reading the Structure Behind Educational Inequality
Moved the median-financial-assets citation to the page that carries the figure, and stated which aggregation it comes from.
- Before
- The cited URL was the survey's index page, and the text read only "approximately ¥7 million."
- After
- Now cites classified data table 4 of the 2022 survey and states that the figure counts households holding no financial assets.
Why we got it wrong The figure itself (¥7 million) is correct and was confirmed in the source spreadsheet. The same survey also reports a median of ¥12.7 million for households that do hold financial assets, so the aggregation has to be named or readers will take the wrong number.
Dormant Deposits Utilization System Application Practical Guide (2026 Edition): Requirements and Preparation from the Public Offering Guidelines
Removed three "system changes" that do not appear in the 2026 public offering guidelines, and rewrote the article based on the guidelines.
- Before
- The article listed three items as 2026 system changes: the full introduction of outcome-based grants, a new accompanying support supplement of up to 10%, and the complete abolition of paper applications.
- After
- All three were removed. The article now covers the composition of grant funds, the self-funding ratio, review criteria, and the application support program, all as stated in the 2026 guidelines.
Why we got it wrong This article was published on 1 April 2026, while the public offering for 2026 fund distribution organizations (regular category) opened on 3 April 2026. The article described "this year's changes" with specific figures before the guidelines were published, without supporting evidence. On checking the published guidelines, two of the three items have no corresponding description, and there is no statement that the application method changed in 2026.
Dormant Deposits Utilization System Application Practical Guide (2026 Edition): Requirements and Preparation from the Public Offering Guidelines
Corrected the self-funding ratio to at least 20% of project costs, as stated in the guidelines.
- Before
- Contributing 10-20% self-funding is desirable
- After
- Implementing organizations secure at least 20% of total project costs from their own or private funds as a principle
Why we got it wrong The guidelines state that organizations "shall, as a principle, secure at least 20% of the total project cost over the grant period from their own funds or private funds." Our introductory guide already stated 20% or more, so the two articles contradicted each other.
Dormant Deposits Utilization System Application Practical Guide (2026 Edition): Requirements and Preparation from the Public Offering Guidelines
Removed the statement that "the indirect cost rate is generally 15% in recent years."
- Before
- Design within the upper limit set by JANPIA's public offering guidelines for indirect cost rates (generally 15% in recent years)
- After
- Administrative expenses are capped at 15% of the grant amount, and at least 85% goes to grants for implementing organizations
Why we got it wrong The 2026 guidelines contain no category called "indirect costs." The closest provision is "administrative expenses" for fund distribution organizations, capped at 15% of the grant amount. The same figure had been applied to a different concept.
Dormant Deposits Utilization System Application Practical Guide (2026 Edition): Requirements and Preparation from the Public Offering Guidelines
Replaced the adoption rate with the actual figures from published results.
- Before
- The recent adoption rate is approximately 25-30%
- After
- In the first round of the 2024 fiscal year regular category, 14 of 70 applications were selected
Why we got it wrong The JANPIA Annual Report was cited as the source for "approximately 25-30%," but no such description could be confirmed. The figures have been replaced with published results. Because the ratio varies by round, the range has been removed.
Dormant Deposits Utilization System Application Practical Guide (2026 Edition): Requirements and Preparation from the Public Offering Guidelines
Replaced the post-monitoring period with the asset disposal restriction stated in the guidelines.
- Before
- Post-monitoring continues for one to three years after completion
- After
- Restrictions on acquired assets continue for five years after project completion, and for buildings, for their statutory useful life
Why we got it wrong No basis could be found for "one to three years." What the guidelines state is the obligation to manage acquired assets for five years after project completion, and for buildings, for the useful life of depreciable assets as defined in the Corporation Tax Act.
Japan's Scheme for Handing Inherited Land to the State Transferred 3,008 Plots in Three Years and Three Months — More Were Withdrawn (1,102) Than Refused (181)
Refreshed the figures to the latest date the Ministry of Justice publishes.
Why we got it wrong The source page carries only the newest snapshot. When it moved to 31 July 2026, the 30 June figures the article cited disappeared from it. The grounds, land types and residual counts have all been moved to the same date.
Vacancies Among Japan's Community Welfare Commissioners Reach 20,091 — The Quota Rose by 424 While 4,476 Fewer People Took the Role
Reframed the vacancy count and the prefecture tallies as our own calculation.
Why we got it wrong The 20,091 is the quota of 240,971 minus the 220,880 appointed; what the ministry publishes is the 91.7% fill rate. The prefecture counts are likewise ours, so both are now presented as the article's own arithmetic.
Japan's Volunteer Fire Corps Gained 37,757 and Lost 52,215 — Adding Up Every Gain in the Three Priority Categories Covers 27% of the Decline
Replaced a share we had produced by adding three chart segments with the breakdown the source publishes.
Why we got it wrong The 41.5% was the sum of three segments of a stacked bar chart and appears nowhere in the source, which states only the 33.5% figure for FY2025. The article now gives the published shares. The decline and percentage for new members were likewise our own arithmetic and have been trimmed to the two published values. The joining and leaving series sit inside charts, so the pages were rendered and read by eye, with the values recorded in the registry.
Japan's Volunteer Fire Corps Gained 37,757 and Lost 52,215 — Adding Up Every Gain in the Three Priority Categories Covers 27% of the Decline
Replaced the peak volunteer firefighter figure with the actual intake, departure and establishment numbers the source publishes.
Why we got it wrong Only the peak headcount was given, so the article's own subject — the gap between people joining and leaving — could not be followed in figures. The published counts are now shown.
89.1% of Japan's 661,000 Local Government Fiscal-Year Appointees Work Part-Time and 75.8% Are Women — Outside the 19-Hour-25-Minute Line Sit Another 452,697
Added the source's notes and detailed counts on fiscal-year appointed staff.
Why we got it wrong Only the figures by sex had been quoted, dropping the source's note that some records have no sex recorded. The note and the detailed breakdown have been added.
Of 4,279 Dismissed From Type A Support Providers, 936 Found Re-employment and 2,073 Moved to Type B — From Work With a Contract to Work Without One
Replaced the account of Type A dismissals, wages and the fee revision with the figures the ministry publishes.
Why we got it wrong The figures describing the scale were not tied to any source. They have been replaced with the monthly counts and the actual wage and allowance levels published by the ministry.
Japan's Disability Employment Rate Hit a 14th Straight Record at 2.41%, Yet Only 46.0% of Firms Meet the Requirement — 57.3% of Those Falling Short Employ No One at All
Corrected the breakdown of firms below quota, the actual employment rates in public bodies, and the description of the exclusion-rate system.
Why we got it wrong The breakdown and the public-sector rates did not match the year or categories in the source. The exclusion-rate system was described as it used to be, so the passage now sets out its history and the current rates.
Of 84,759 Pupils in Japan Needing Japanese Language Support, 9,699 Receive None — Both the Number and the Share Are Up on the Last Survey
Corrected the number of schools with pupils needing Japanese language support and the progression-rate comparisons.
Why we got it wrong The national comparison figures used in the progression rates came from a different year than the source. The distribution of schools by size and the change over time have also been added.
Weekend School Clubs Move to the Community by FY2031, While Weekdays Carry Neither Target Nor Deadline — What the Shift From Transfer to Delivery Left Behind
Replaced the description of the club-activity reform, including the activity-hour limits, with what the current national plan actually sets out.
Why we got it wrong The activity-hour limits came from an earlier guideline and are not part of the current plan. The passage now follows what the cited plan states.
69.0% of Registered Foster Households in Japan Have No Child Placed With Them — Against a 75% Target, the Rate for Under-Threes Is 25.3%
Replaced the bare multipliers for the growth in foster carers with the counts the source publishes.
Why we got it wrong The 1.4x and 1.7x multipliers had been attached to the wrong quantities. The counts are now given so that it is clear which figure grew by how much.
68.8% of Children Who Died From Abuse Were Under One, and 48.5% of Those Died on the Day They Were Born — Of Those 16, an Agency Had Been Involved With One
Updated the figures on abuse deaths of infants under one to the latest report and added the breakdown.
Why we got it wrong The 504 deaths were the cumulative total to the twentieth report; a further tranche has since been added. The denominators for the percentages also did not match the report's categories, so the passage now follows those categories.
93.4% of Adult Guardianship Applications Cite Managing or Closing a Bank Account — The Entrance to a System for Supporting Decisions Sits at a Bank Counter
Added the case counts the source gives alongside the percentages for guardianship applications and appointments, and corrected the hearing-length figure.
Why we got it wrong The article gave percentages without their denominators. The source publishes both counts and percentages, so the counts have been restored. The 37.9% hearing-length figure did not match the source's categories.
Care Managers Average 55.1 Years, the Oldest of Any Role in Japanese Care — Exam Candidates Fell From 131,560 to 49,332 and Have Not Returned in Seven Years
Checked every care manager exam figure against the ministry's table row by row and added the years and cumulative totals that were missing.
Why we got it wrong Every figure in the article matched the source table. The article covered only the most recent years, however, omitting the lowest year and the cumulative totals, which have now been added from the full table.
Fraud Losses in Japan Rose 98% in a Year While Cases Cleared Stood Still — Most Reports From People in Their 30s, Most Money From Those in Their 70s
Replaced the minus 0.0% year-on-year change in fraud arrests with the actual count, and added the breakdown of losses.
Why we got it wrong Minus 0.0% was a single-case decline expressed as a rate, which carries no meaning as a rate. It has been replaced with the count the source gives.
424 of the 449 Disaster-Related Deaths in Noto Were Aged 70 or Over — Individual Evacuation Plans Cover 15.1% of the Registers, and 40°C Has Now Settled Over Kumamoto's Shelters
Updated the Fire and Disaster Management Agency casualty figures to the latest bulletin.
Why we got it wrong The bulletin is revised as new reports come in, and the figures the article quoted from the 35th report were out of date.
Japan's National Pension Payment Rate Hits 79.6%, Rising for a 14th Year — Yet Fewer Months Are Actually Being Paid
Confirmed the unit correspondence for the payment-month figures.
Why we got it wrong The 71.28, 89.34 and 96.52 million figures restate the ministry's 7,128, 8,934 and 9,652 expressed in units of 10,000 months. The one-to-one correspondence has been checked and recorded in the registry.
A Religious Corporation's Assets Come into View Only as It Nears Dissolution — 83.4 Billion Yen at Liquidation and the Three-Stage Design of Disclosure
Aligned the liquidation asset figure with the source's wording and added the procedural history.
Why we got it wrong The source says just over 83.4 billion yen, which the article had rounded down to about 83.4 billion. The procedural history has also been added.
For a Distant Tsunami That Brings No Shaking, Only Trust in the Warning Drives Evacuation — the Dilemma of False Alarms and Misses
Corrected the evacuation rates for each earthquake to the figures each survey publishes.
Why we got it wrong Evacuation rates are defined differently in each survey depending on when the person left, yet they were presented as the same measure. For the 2003 Tokachi-oki earthquake only the highest municipality was quoted; the lowest is now shown alongside it.
The Linear-Shizuoka Agreement Now Carries a Clause to Halt the Work — How a Century-Old Memory of Water Loss Became Procedure
Added the source's qualification and the agricultural damage figures to the account of the Tanna Tunnel works.
Why we got it wrong The source hedges these figures as reported estimates, so stating them as established values was too strong. The scale of agricultural damage has also been added.
46% of New Vets Go to Pets, 11% to Livestock — Japan Isn't Short of Vets, They're Maldistributed
Replaced the summed total for livestock veterinarians with the per-category counts the source publishes, and removed the prefectural percentages.
Why we got it wrong The 7,771 figure was the sum of two categories, a total the source does not give. The prefectural shares and the 3.3% and 5.9% declines were also our own calculations.
Bear Injuries Hit a Record 216 in Japan — Depopulation Has Emptied the Hands That Tended the Boundary
Corrected the number of bears culled under permit from 14,745 to 14,741 and added the monthly and prefectural breakdown.
Why we got it wrong Two places in the same article carried different figures; the source gives 14,741.
Teacher Attrition from Mental Illness Hits a Record 1,319 — Will the Raise Reach the Root?
Restated the number of teachers leaving because of mental illness with the breakdown by school type.
Why we got it wrong The 1,319 and 950 figures were sums across school types that the source does not publish as totals, and the increase of 369 and the 8.5% share were derived from them.
Kumamoto's Car Society Cannot Be Solved by Roads — Transit's Downward Spiral and Planning Backward from Where People Live
Corrected fiscal years to calendar years, as the source chart labels them, and added the required headcount.
Why we got it wrong The Japan Bus Association chart runs 2017 to 2030 on a calendar-year axis, not fiscal years. The figures themselves (116 / 93 / 36 thousand) match the chart. The required headcount of 129,000 has been added so the shortfall has a stated basis.
Kumamoto's Car Society Cannot Be Solved by Roads — Transit's Downward Spiral and Planning Backward from Where People Live
Restated the Kumamoto travel-mode shares using all three survey rounds the source publishes.
Why we got it wrong The article skipped the middle round and connected only the first and last. Public transport was flat in the middle round, so the trend reads differently once all three are shown.
Repairs Keep Surfacing After You Buy a Kominka — The Information Gap Born of Inheritance and Aging
Replaced a figure we had produced by adding three chart slices with the breakdown the source actually publishes.
Why we got it wrong The 73.2% was the sum of three slices of a pie chart (20.4 + 26.4 + 26.4) and appears nowhere in the source, which states only that more than seven in ten were built in 1980 or earlier. The article now gives the three published shares. The 73.2 that does appear in the full report is the share of wooden buildings among vacant homes built in 2011 or later — a different table.
Repairs Keep Surfacing After You Buy a Kominka — The Information Gap Born of Inheritance and Aging
Corrected the statistical category name for vacant homes, the vacant-home bank participation figures, and the cumulative transaction count.
Why we got it wrong The category name did not match the official one used in the statistics. The 3.3% and 38.7% figures and the vacant-home bank counts could not be confirmed, and have been replaced with survey results that can be.
Furusato Tax Points Ban: A Six-Month Review of System Purpose and Return-Gift Competition
Replaced the 61.8% uncertain share with the surveyor's own answer options, repointed Yokohama's outflow at the ministry survey, and removed Kawasaki's figure.
Why we got it wrong The 61.8% was the sum of three answer options; the surveyor writes only 'about 60%'. The article cited for the Yokohama and Kawasaki figures is behind a content block and its text could not be retrieved. Yokohama's figure was confirmed in the ministry survey and repointed there; Kawasaki's 13.5 billion yen could not be confirmed and has been dropped. The Kanagawa total is now given exactly as the source states it.
Japan's 2024 Problem One Year In — Working Hour Caps on Trucking, Construction, and Doctors and the Gap Between Rule and Reality
Moved three logistics and construction figures to documents that carry them, and matched the published values.
Why we got it wrong All three were cited to index or press-listing pages carrying no figures. They now point at the Revised Logistics Efficiency Act pamphlet, the labour unit price press release, and the redelivery rate release. The 125-hour and 44% figures are both FY2028 targets, now stated as such. The '22.9% since 2021' was a compounding of annual growth rates that appears nowhere in the source, replaced with the published weighted average and year-on-year change.
Chemical Management and SDS Compliance: Legal Reform and the Burden Structure on Japanese SMEs
Removed three of the four substance counts for labelling and SDS obligations and replaced them with figures that can be verified.
Why we got it wrong The 896 matched the file size marker [896KB] on the ministry's circulars page. The 1,600 was a chemical registry number in a different PDF, and the 2,900 appears in no source. Cumulative totals derived by addition have been dropped in favour of the figures the sources actually publish.
The 'Can't Earn a Living' Problem in Japan's Rural Migration Push — A Career-Design Vacuum in Regional Revitalization Policy
Corrected per-capita prefectural income, average pay by industry, and the settlement rates and career paths of regional revitalisation volunteers.
Why we got it wrong The income and volunteer figures were out of date. The 2.4-fold and 3-fold gaps were our own divisions and do not appear in the sources.
Securing Crew in Japanese Fisheries — A Primary-Sector Labor Crisis and the Risk of Structural Shutdown
Corrected the number of fisheries cooperatives, the number of specified skilled workers, world fisheries output, and the workforce in the Iwami area.
Why we got it wrong The cooperative and workforce figures came from mismatched years. The claim of a 45% fall over twenty years was a calculation absent from the source, with no stated baseline.
What Divides Japan's Teacher Shortage Is the Prefecture: A 4.4x Recruitment Gap and 43 Worsening Local Governments
Moved two citations to documents that carry the figures, and corrected which OECD average the 41-hour figure refers to.
Why we got it wrong The enrolment figures were cited to a page explaining the special-needs system, which carries no numbers; they now point at MEXT's Special Needs Education Data compiled from the School Basic Survey, with FY2024 added. On TALIS, 41.0 hours is the average across participating countries for elementary teachers; the OECD average for junior-high teachers is 40.4 hours, making the gap 14.7 hours. The OECD page refuses requests, so the citation now points at the Japanese national report on the same survey.
One Year After Japan's Loneliness and Isolation Countermeasures Act: Why Only 0.6% of Municipalities Set Up Regional Councils
Corrected the currency conversion of Seoul's loneliness budget and the Japanese platform subsidy figures to what the sources state.
Why we got it wrong The dollar and yen conversions were ours; the source gives only the dollar figure as reported by CNN. The Japanese subsidy is published as a per-authority ceiling, not a national total.
Japan's April 2026 Welfare Reform: What Changed, and What Didn't
Replaced the 15-20% take-up rate for public assistance with the indicator name and ranges the source uses.
Why we got it wrong The source does not use a take-up rate; it reports a household coverage ratio, separately for an income-only test and a test that also counts assets. The value moves a great deal between the two, but only one range was given.
When Private Afterschool Care Costs Exceed Take-Home Pay — The Market Mechanics of Japan's Child Penalty
Corrected the private afterschool fee bands, the dual-earner household figures, and the fall in income after childbirth.
Why we got it wrong The fee bands came from the paywalled part of the article and could not be verified, so the passage now keeps to the headline and lead. The dual-earner figures were cited to a chart showing dual-earner versus homemaker households, which carries no breakdown by working hours. The report states a fall of roughly 60% after childbirth; the figure of 67.8% appears nowhere in it.
Japan's Bicycle Blue Ticket: One-Month Review of 2,147 Citations, 7 Zero Prefectures, and the Logic of a 'Visibility Device'
Reframed the top-three share and the fine total as our own calculation.
Why we got it wrong The 87% is the sum of three published shares and the ¥14.58 million is counts multiplied by fine levels; neither is published by the police. Both are now presented as the article's own arithmetic rather than as source figures.
Japan's 2025 Births Fall to 671,000 — 15 Years Ahead of Projections, Even as Marriages Rose
Corrected the family-policy spending shares of GDP for France and Japan to the year and definition the source uses.
Why we got it wrong Neither 2.9% nor 1.6% matched any year or definition in the source. Family-policy spending varies with the definition used, so the figures are now given per definition.
A Nation That Underinvests in Education — Japan's Public Spending at 56% of the OECD Average and the Inequality It Perpetuates
Corrected the household share of higher education costs, teacher starting salaries, class size, and the share of non-teaching duties.
Why we got it wrong The source publishes teacher pay as a range from minimum to maximum, but the article compared only the minimums and called the gap large. The class size is 27, and the 71% figure for non-teaching duties does not appear in the source.
Financial Income in Insurance Premiums by FY2028 — Fixing the Anomaly Where Filing a Tax Return Raises Your Premium
Updated total social security benefits and their funding breakdown to the latest published year.
Why we got it wrong The published figures have been revised, and the share of GDP has moved with the revision of the denominator.
The Digital Deficit and the 'Year of the AI Agent' — Three Structural Biases Settling in the Draft Phase of Japan's Digital Society Vision Council
Restated the digital-services trade deficit using the figures and range the source gives.
Why we got it wrong The figure was written to the last hundred million yen even though the total depends on which service categories are included. It is now given as the source presents it.
The Fragility of 'One Million Furusato Residents': Can Numerical Targets Qualify as EBPM?
Corrected the year of the related-population estimate from 2024 to the FY2023 survey.
Why we got it wrong The same figure comes from the FY2023 survey. The year has been aligned with the source.
The Day Digital Textbooks Became Official: Decoding Japan's 2026 Cabinet Decision
Corrected classroom Wi-Fi coverage from 95.4% to 96.2%.
Why we got it wrong The 95.4% belonged to a different line on the same chart (wired in-school LAN) and to an earlier year. The wireless figure has been taken from the correct year.
Japan's 2026 Social Insurance Burden Rush — ¥4,800 More a Year at a ¥6M Income
Corrected the levy rates for FY2027 onward and the growth rate of earned income to what the sources state.
Why we got it wrong The 0.37% and 0.44% rates appear neither on the Children and Families Agency page nor in the MHLW explanatory materials; both give the FY2028 contribution of ¥900 billion and illustrative amounts by income. The published illustration for a ¥6 million income in FY2028 is ¥1,000 a month, not ¥1,100. Earned income grew at 0.4% a year over 24 years, not 0.5% over 25.
Where Did 1.3 Trillion Yen in Hometown Tax Go? — The Redistribution That Never Reaches 'the Regions'
Corrected the outflow amounts and cost breakdown for the hometown tax scheme to the published figures.
Why we got it wrong The Yokohama and Tokyo amounts were from the wrong year. The cost breakdown percentages also did not match the denominator the source uses.
353,970 Non-Attending Students: What Japan's 12-Year High Conceals
Corrected the counts for long absences, students with no specialist consultation, and ICT-based attendance recognition, and moved the citation from a notice page to the survey summary.
Why we got it wrong The figure of about 67,000 students absent 90 days or more conflated the count with high-school non-attendance (67,782); the published figure is 191,958, or 54.2%. Students receiving no specialist consultation number 135,724, and the 38.3% share is printed in the source. The 10,409 ICT attendance figure was FY2022; the FY2024 figure is 13,261. The 3.8% enrolment share and 'one in 26' appear nowhere in the source and have been replaced with the published 38.6 per 1,000. The cited URL was a notice page carrying no figures and now points at the survey summary.
The Reality After Japan's Digital Textbook 'Formalization': How the Three-Option System Entrenches Regional Inequality
Corrected the shares of teachers able to use ICT and those who had taken training, to match the survey year cited.
Why we got it wrong The survey year cited and the year the figures came from did not match. The prefectural high and low figures have been taken again from the correct year.
The End of Real Estate Tax Avoidance: Japan's Inheritance Tax '5-Year Rule' and the Structural Closure of Intergenerational Wealth Transfer Routes
Corrected the cumulative education-fund trust figures and the amounts in the 2022 Supreme Court tower-condominium case to the itemised figures in the source.
Why we got it wrong The three case figures were all totals, and the cited site could not be retrieved. They have been replaced with a scholarly article that recites the judgment's findings, with the components sourced individually. The assessed-road-price valuation is in fact 333,706,241 yen; the article had rounded off the last three digits. The trust totals were also out of date.
The Emergency Revision of Long-Term Care Reimbursement Rates and Its Structural Limits: The Government's Own Confession That the Ordinary System Can No Longer Keep Up
Corrected the share of care providers struggling to recruit, the reasons given, the pay gap with all industries, and the number of foreign care workers.
Why we got it wrong None of the percentages matched the survey question or year in the source. The pay gap is now given as the two actual figures the source publishes rather than as a derived difference, and the foreign worker count has been set to the published number.
The Blind Spot of Japan's Minimum Wage 'Effective Date Disparity': Real Wages Diverge by 181 Days Within the Same Year
Corrected Okinawa's real annual average from about 1,005 yen, and noted that the 181-day gap is our own count rather than a figure from the source.
Why we got it wrong The 1,005 yen figure is Ibaraki's pre-revision minimum wage as listed on the source page. The source calculates only Akita's 991 yen and gives no real annual average for Okinawa, so the 14-yen gap was derived from a figure that does not apply. Applying the same formula to Akita reproduces the source's 991 yen, and the Okinawa figure is now labelled as our own calculation.
Who Gets the ¥9.5 Trillion? — Questioning Japan's 'Tourism Nation' Without Residents
Corrected the concentration of foreign overnight stays in the three largest metropolitan areas, accommodation tax revenue, overseas city tax rates and revenue, and land price growth.
Why we got it wrong The concentration figure did not match the source's definition. The overseas revenue figures included yen conversions of our own, and the land price growth rates did not correspond to the survey points in the source.
Structural Analysis of Foreign Aid Budget Allocation: Does the ODA vs. Domestic Welfare Tradeoff Hold?
Moved the poverty figure to the survey summary and replaced the ODA total with JICA's published breakdown.
Why we got it wrong The poverty rate was cited to an index page carrying no figures. The ¥3.9 trillion total does not appear in the JICA release cited, so the breakdown that release does publish is used instead. Figures cited to MOFA and OECD pages remain unverified because both refuse automated requests.
Kyoto's Vacant House Tax and Its National Ripple Effect — Can Tax Policy Reduce Empty Homes?
Corrected the vacancy rate to the prefecture figure the source publishes.
Why we got it wrong The 14.1% belongs to Nara in the national results cited; Kyoto Prefecture stands at 13.1%. The source carries no city-level breakdown, so the figures for Kyoto City alone have been dropped.
The Disappearing Workforce of Local Government — What Halved Exam Ratios and Surging Youth Resignations Reveal
Moved the headcount citation to a document that carries the figures and dropped resignation counts from a mismatched year.
Why we got it wrong The ministry survey cited is the FY2021 edition, while the article's figures are for FY2022; the FY2022 edition could not be located, so the counts have been dropped. The headcount page renders its tables in JavaScript, so the citation now points at the FY2025 staffing survey key-points PDF, whose chart and table were rendered and read by eye for the 3,282 thousand peak in 1994 and the 2,809,298 as of April 2025. The OECD general-government employment share remains unverified because the site refuses automated requests.
The Disappearing Workforce of Local Government — What Halved Exam Ratios and Surging Youth Resignations Reveal
Corrected the competition ratio for local government exams, staff numbers, starting salaries, and the number on long-term sick leave.
Why we got it wrong The starting year and value for the competition ratio did not match the source. Staff numbers were rounded and have been replaced with the published counts. The starting-salary comparison was dropped because the public and private surveys use different definitions.
The Year of the Fire Horse 2026 and the Truth Behind Japan's Declining Birthrate: When Superstition Has No Room Left to Move
Replaced the year-on-year change for the 1966 hinoeuma birth count with the actual figures for the surrounding years.
Why we got it wrong The minus 25.4% was a calculation of ours that does not appear in the source. The neighbouring years' figures are now given instead.
The Core of Japan's Declining Birthrate Is Not Childcare Support: Interrogating How 140 Trillion Yen of Social Expenditure Is Split
Corrected the birth counts, total social security benefits, their generational split, and the unmarried rate among non-regular male workers.
Why we got it wrong The social security total used the wrong year and classification, and the 10-trillion-yen child-related category is not a grouping the source uses. The 75.6% and 30.7% unmarried rates could not be confirmed.
Corporate Tax as Indirect Tax — How the Defense Surtax Reaches Citizens' Wallets
Corrected the NATO Europe and Canada average, SIPRI's figure for Japan's military spending, and the Agency for Cultural Affairs budget.
Why we got it wrong NATO's table of defence spending as a share of real GDP gives 2.27 for 2025; 2.3 was a rounding. SIPRI states that Japan's military expenditure reached 62.2 billion dollars in 2025, so 62 billion was a truncation. The culture budget was out by one fiscal year: the FY2025 figure is 106.3 billion yen.
Japan's 1.13 Fertility Rate — The 2015 Turning Point When Married Couples Stopped Having Children
Updated the 2024 birth and marriage counts to the final figures, and corrected the child-rearing cost and family-policy spending as a share of GDP.
Why we got it wrong The birth and marriage counts were preliminary and have since been finalised. The GDP shares for family policy did not match the year or definition used by the source.
Is Japan's Childcare Levy a 'Bachelor Tax'? — The Political Reason Social Insurance Was Chosen Over Tax
Corrected the child-rearing support levy rate and per-person amounts, France's family spending share, and Japan's birth count.
Why we got it wrong The levy rate did not match the source, and the burden is set as a monthly amount per scheme rather than a single rate. The claim of 110,000 social media posts could not be confirmed. The birth count has since been finalised.
5.26% Wage Hike, Fourth Straight Year of Negative Real Wages — How Japan's Triple Squeeze Works
Moved the minimum wage to MHLW's own announcement and dropped an international ranking that could not be checked.
Why we got it wrong The minimum wage was cited to a payroll vendor's article; MHLW announces the ¥1,121 national weighted average and the ¥66 increase itself. Japan's rank in the OECD average annual wage series could not be checked: the article cited runs to a second page that could not be retrieved, and the OECD site refuses automated requests. MHLW's white paper comparison on a 1996 = 100 basis is used instead.
The Structure of Japan's 55% Inheritance Tax — What the World's Highest Rate Really Means
Corrected the US estate tax exemption and removed the count of business succession plan applications.
Why we got it wrong The 11.18 million dollar figure was a conversion whose exchange rate and year could not be pinned down. The 21,748 applications could not be traced to a source and have been dropped.
Closing Libraries, Digging Shelters — The Tradeoff Between Defense Expansion and Cultural Budget Cuts
Repointed the 106.3 billion yen culture budget at a document whose contents can actually be read.
Why we got it wrong When this figure was corrected earlier today, the PDF cited as its source turned out to be malformed and could not be read. It now points to the FY2026 overview, which states the figure for both FY2025 and FY2026.
Closing Libraries, Digging Shelters — The Tradeoff Between Defense Expansion and Cultural Budget Cuts
Corrected the education budget, shelter counts and population coverage, the number of public libraries, and the New York Public Library budget cut.
Why we got it wrong The education budget confused the category that includes science and technology promotion with the one that does not. The shelter counts conflated all designated evacuation facilities with underground shelters. The coverage figures for other countries also did not match the sources.
Is Babysitter Pay a 'Business Expense'? — The Structural Fault Line in Childcare Tax Deductions
Corrected the number of dual-income households and replaced the average monthly childcare fees with the income-based bands the source sets out.
Why we got it wrong No national average monthly childcare fee is published. What the state sets is an eight-band ceiling by household income, which cannot be written as an average.
Japan's 4,317 Teacher Shortage — Why No One Wants to Teach
Replaced a computed multiple with the published counts and updated the recruitment ratio to the latest published figures.
Why we got it wrong The 1.85 times was 3,827 divided by 2,065 and appears nowhere in the source; the counts and shortage rates are now given directly. The recruitment ratio was cited to an index page carrying no figures and now points at the latest implementation report.
"My Number Card Can't Be Used" — Generational Data on the Digital Divide
Corrected the My Number card holding rate, internet use among older people, the number of cards due for renewal, and the share of clinics reporting problems.
Why we got it wrong The holding and usage rates were out of date. The 87.5% figure was derived by inverting the share of clinics reporting no problems, which is what the source actually publishes. The estimate of 16 million non-users, or 13% of the population, could not be confirmed.
Is a 14.3% Turnover Rate 'Low'? — The Triple Burden of Wages, Working Conditions, and Social Standing in Care Work
Corrected the average pay for care workers and for all industries, and the share reporting physical strain.
Why we got it wrong The 386,000 yen all-industry average did not match the indicator in the source, and the roughly 80,000 yen gap was derived from it. The share reporting physical strain is 29.3% in the source.
Inside Japan's 22.1% Gender Wage Gap — The Structure That 'Equal Pay for Equal Work' Cannot Explain
Corrected the share of women in management and the female labour participation rate to the source's definition and year.
Why we got it wrong The definition of management did not match the source. What the source publishes is an employment rate for a different age band, not a labour force participation rate.
20% of Japan's Water Pipes Are Past Their Service Life — Data on an Invisible Infrastructure Crisis
Updated the total length of water mains, the ageing rate, and the length and rate of replacement to the latest published figures.
Why we got it wrong All of these had been revised since publication. The pace of replacement needed has also been added for comparison.
Why Japan Names Crime Victims in the News — The Structure of Media Disclosure and Secondary Victimization
Rewrote the passage on the naming of victims to state only what the sources confirm.
Why we got it wrong The claim that lawyers for the bereaved families lodged a protest could not be confirmed in the sources. It has been replaced with what can be confirmed: the timing, the type of outlet, and the number of victims named.
Aid Abroad, Neglect at Home? Unpacking Japan's ODA Critique and Fiscal Reality
Moved the poverty figures from a survey index page to the summary report, and replaced the ODA programme total with the breakdown JICA publishes.
Why we got it wrong The poverty rate was cited to the survey's index page; the figures are in the summary PDF. The source publishes the 44.5% under 'households with one adult' among working households with children rather than 'single-parent households', and the wording now follows it. The ¥3.9038 trillion does not appear in the JICA release cited; the government-wide figure sits on a MOFA page that refuses automated requests, so JICA's published breakdown is used instead. Figures cited to MOFA and OECD pages remain unverified because both refuse automated requests; each case is recorded in scripts/unverifiable-statrefs.json.
Aid Abroad, Neglect at Home? Unpacking Japan's ODA Critique and Fiscal Reality
Replaced the 20-30% take-up rate for public assistance with the indicator name and ranges the source actually uses.
Why we got it wrong The source does not use a take-up rate; it reports a household coverage ratio under several different tests. The value moves a great deal depending on the test, but the article quoted only one range.
Gen Z Is Not Lazy: The Structural Trap That Makes "Not Working" a Rational Choice in Japan
Corrected the number of public assistance applications, the share of elderly households, the non-regular employment figures, the mental health survey, and the description of the earned income deduction.
Why we got it wrong The application figure was a monthly average presented as an annual total. The 43.9% was not the share of young recipients with mental illness but the share of companies naming those in their teens and twenties as the age group with the most mental health cases. The deduction thresholds and effective marginal rate also did not match the source.
Fertility Rate 1.15 on a ¥7.3 Trillion Budget: Evaluating Three Years of Japan's Children and Families Agency
Corrected the number of births, the relationship between non-regular employment and marriage, the national burden rate, and the scale of the child-rearing support levy.
Why we got it wrong The birth figure had been revised in the final count. The 69.1% and 49.5% marriage-intention figures do not appear in the source, which instead reports a regional correlation. The 46.8% burden rate was a projection at the time of publication; the later actual figure is 45.7%. The levy amount also differed from the source.
695,000 Licensed Nurses Not at Work — The Structure of Nurse Attrition and the 7-to-1 Staffing Trap
Corrected the number of inactive nurses, the job-openings-to-applicants ratio, the overtime shares, nurses per 1,000 population, and the supply-demand outlook.
Why we got it wrong The job-openings ratio was from a different year. The overtime shares and the OECD nurses-per-1,000 figure were either absent from the source or belonged to a different indicator. The supply-demand outlook also did not match the source.
Prohibition Orders Can't Stop Stalkers — The Case for Mandatory GPS Monitoring
Replaced the GPS misuse count with the series the police publish.
Why we got it wrong The figure of 370 does not appear in the police material; the text now follows the two published series. The Korean recidivism figures remain unverified because JBpress is behind a membership wall.
Prohibition Orders Can't Stop Stalkers — The Case for Mandatory GPS Monitoring
Corrected the figures on contacting stalking offenders and on treatment take-up, and removed the claim that the arrest count was a record.
Why we got it wrong The take-up rate used the number of prohibition orders as its denominator rather than the number of contacts, so it did not match the source. What the source gives is the number of contacts made and the number of people who went on to treatment. The word record does not appear in the source.
The Structure of Price Hikes — Why Only Food Keeps Rising
Updated the 2025 spring wage round figures from the first tally to the final one.
Why we got it wrong All three figures came from the first tally in March 2025; the final tally published on 3 July 2025 gives different values. The claim of the highest level in 33 years does not appear in the source and has been replaced with a comparison to the previous year. The size bracket is also under 300 employees in the source, not 299 or fewer.
Cities Where Prices Rose and Cities Where They Didn't — The Structure of Regional CPI Disparities
Corrected the regional consumer price indices and the electricity bill comparison.
Why we got it wrong The lowest index belongs to Gunma, not Kagoshima City. The electricity figures were calculated from contract assumptions of our own and differed from the published amounts.
Japan's ¥135.5 Trillion Social Security Breakdown — Pensions 41.6%, Healthcare 33.6%, and a ¥65M Generational Gap
Corrected the pension reserve's assets under management and cumulative returns, long-term care benefits, and the generational accounting figures.
Why we got it wrong The asset and return figures were out of date, and the generational accounting amounts did not match the cohorts or values in the source.
The Anatomy of Japan's 'Child Penalty' — The Triple Burden of Child Allowance, Education, and Housing
Corrected the household share of education costs, the total education expenditure, the deprivation rates for single-parent households, and the drop in mothers' earnings after childbirth.
Why we got it wrong The education totals were rounded approximations that did not match the published amounts. The deprivation rates did not correspond to the survey questions, and the earnings-drop figures did not match the source's categories.
A Country Where Politicians Win Without Elections — 26% Uncontested and 2,000+ Seat Shortfalls Question the Meaning of "Representation"
Dropped the 25.9% uncontested-election rate and replaced it with the district and seat counts the source publishes.
Why we got it wrong The 25.9% figure does not appear in the source. What the source gives is the number of uncontested districts and the number of members elected without a vote.
Japan's Consumption Tax Regressivity Depends on the Lens — Effective Burden Rates and the Social Insurance Blind Spot
Dropped the share of general account revenue attributed to consumption tax.
Why we got it wrong The 33.3% does not appear in the finance ministry document cited, which tracks the national burden ratio. The 5.7% and 2.1% from the household survey also remain unverified, as the statistics bureau page is a link list rather than a table.
Is Foreign Crime Really Rising in Japan? — The 1.36x Adjusted Rate and the Invisible Sanction System
Corrected the arrest counts for crimes by foreign nationals, the Japanese arrest total, the nationality breakdown, and the suspended-sentence rate.
Why we got it wrong The 43,622 figure covers crimes by all foreign nationals; restricted to visiting foreign nationals it is 33,037. The categories had been conflated. The claim that two countries account for about 60% was a calculation absent from the source, which instead publishes counts by nationality.
Why Wages Don't Feel Higher Despite 5%+ Shunto Gains — The Structure Behind Four Consecutive Years of Negative Real Wages
Replaced two annual-salary figures and the 600-trillion-yen retained-earnings figure with the monthly wages and ordinary profit the sources actually publish; also corrected the source for the 2.3% nominal wage rise.
Why we got it wrong Neither survey publishes annual salaries. The 4.05 million yen figure was the monthly 338,200 yen multiplied by twelve; the 6.60 million yen figure appears in no source. The two also measure different things (scheduled pay versus pay including bonuses), so they cannot be compared as annual salaries. The 600 trillion yen came from a page listing research papers, with no such figure on it. The 2.3% rise was taken from a single-month December release and presented as the full-year figure.
Japan's 2030 Digital Textbook Mandate — Three Forces Behind the Cabinet Decision
Corrected the classroom Wi-Fi coverage rate, Sweden's textbook budget, and the share of pupils reporting fatigue after digital-textbook lessons.
Why we got it wrong The 95.4% belonged to a different line on the same chart (wired in-school LAN) and to March 2021, not March 2023; the wireless figure for March 2023 is 95.7%. The textbook budget differed between the Japanese and English versions while citing the same source, and that source cannot be retrieved. The fatigue figures took only the upper end of ranges the ministry report states as 20-30% and 20-40%.
Why Don't Wages Rise Despite 'Labor Shortages'? — The Structure of a Labor Market Where Supply and Demand Fail
Restated the job-seeker count to match the published table.
Why we got it wrong The Japanese version said about 1.93 million and the English 1.76 million. Both now follow the published monthly averages of 1,929,824 for 2024 and 1,906,836 for 2025.
The Paradox of Population Decline and Record Tax Revenue — How Much Has Per Capita Tax Burden Increased?
Corrected the total population to the published figure and moved the citation to the monthly report.
Why we got it wrong The population estimates page renders its tables in JavaScript. The citation now points at the monthly PDF and follows the confirmed figure. The Japanese and English versions had also carried different numbers (123.22 million against 122.6 million); both now match the source.
A Data Analysis of the 744 'At-Risk' Municipalities — The Structure That Tokyo Siphons
Corrected the counts of municipalities at risk of disappearing and the projected fall in the young female population.
Why we got it wrong The figure of about 282 municipalities was the sum of 165 and 117, a total the source does not give. The 87.5% was stated without saying which municipality or what population it referred to; the numerator and denominator are now shown.
Tokunoshima TFR 2.25, Higashiyama 0.76 — Mapping Birth Rates Across 1,741 Municipalities
Replaced the fertility rate description with what the source states.
Why we got it wrong The 1.26 is an annual vital statistics figure and does not appear in the municipal report cited; the text now follows that report's distribution and its two highest municipalities. Tokyo's 0.99 remains unverified because Nikkei is behind a paywall.
30 Years of Social Insurance Premiums — How Much Has Take-Home Pay Fallen for a ¥300K Monthly Salary?
Stopped presenting the 1990 premium and the founding rate as source figures.
Why we got it wrong Neither the ¥36,150 nor the 3.4% appears in the Cabinet Office tax commission material cited. The former is a calculation from the rates then in force and the latter a widely known figure, so neither is now attributed to that source.
Welfare Capture Rates and the 12-Fold Prefectural Gap: A Data-Driven Analysis
Replaced the 0.4% fraud share of public assistance spending with the counts and amounts the source publishes.
Why we got it wrong The 0.4% does not appear in the source; it was the amount divided by the total. The published counts and amounts are now given alongside the total.
Japan's New Bicycle Fines: 2026 Penalty List for 113 Violation Types
Corrected the year of the National Police Agency figure from 2024 to 2025, and restored the source's wording that cyclists were also at fault.
Why we got it wrong The share belongs to the 2025 figures, not 2024. The source says cyclists were also in breach, which does not mean the other party was blameless.
¥70–80 Million per Legislator: Salary, Allowances, JR Passes, and the Full Cost of Japan's Diet Members
Corrected which article sets the salary floor and which grounds the JR pass, and dropped an annual total that could not be verified.
Why we got it wrong The 'not less than the highest general-service civil-servant salary' wording belongs to Article 35 of the Diet Act; Article 1 of the Salary Act sets the amounts themselves. The e-Gov page renders its text in JavaScript, so a fetch returns only 104 characters; the text was confirmed through e-Gov's law API. The JR pass rests on Article 10, while Article 8 covers travel on parliamentary business. The ¥1.4 billion annual total could not be checked because the magazine article cited is paywalled beyond its first page.
"Is ¥5.9M Annual Income Low-Income?" — Visualizing the Gap Between Perception and Policy
Updated the education cost totals to the revised figures and replaced the OECD wage comparison, whose source site has closed, with JILPT's.
Why we got it wrong MEXT revised these education cost figures on 16 January 2026; the 5.96 million, 19.76 million and 1.03 million yen figures were on the pre-revision basis. The wage comparison cited an OECD statistics site that has since closed and could not be verified, so it has been replaced with JILPT's index of hourly manufacturing wages on a purchasing power parity basis.
Do You Know the 'Conditions' for Free University Tuition? — Income Limits, Multi-Child Requirements, and International Comparison
Moved the tuition caps to a document that carries them and dropped beneficiary counts that could not be found.
Why we got it wrong The caps were cited to a system landing page carrying no amounts; they now point at MEXT's leaflet, with admission fees added. The figures of 340,000 rising to 750,000 beneficiaries appear neither on the JASSO page nor on MEXT's system page. Figures cited to the OECD country note remain unverified because the site refuses automated requests.
Is "Half Your Income Goes to Taxes" True? — The Reality Behind Japan's 46% National Burden Rate
Corrected the GDP-basis burden rate, the national income basis rate, Japan's OECD ranking, the initial pension contribution rate, and the 13.5 trillion yen in transfers from the working-age population.
Why we got it wrong The 34.5% was Costa Rica's national-income-basis figure in the ministry's international comparison chart, where the bar label is the national income basis and the bracketed figure is the GDP basis. The 46.8% was a projection at the time; the later actual figure is 45.7%. The 4.9% initial pension rate appears nowhere in the rate table, whose first row is 64.00 per mille, or 6.4%. The 13.5 trillion yen figure does not appear in the cited report at all.
Suicide Is a 'Preventable Death' — Structural Approaches from Platform Doors, Generative AI, and Genetic Research
Corrected the suicide rate and the count of school-age suicides to MHLW's published figures.
Why we got it wrong The rate of 15.4 per 100,000 differs from the published 16.4 for 2024, and school-age suicides numbered 529, not 527. The OECD comparison has been dropped because the WHO statistics site refuses automated requests; the two cited papers also remain unverified because PubMed returns a challenge page.
Structural Contradictions of the Technical Intern Training Program — Between 'International Contribution' and Labor Shortages
Moved the pre-departure fee and disappearance figures to the surveys that actually publish them.
Why we got it wrong The expert council's final report, cited for the ¥540,000 average, contains no monetary figure. The agency's own survey of costs paid by trainees gives ¥542,311 and a breakdown by nationality. The disappearance count was cited to an MHLW page on labour-standards inspections, which does not cover disappearances; it now points at the Immigration Services Agency statistics, with the post-2023 decline added. The claim of more than 100,000 since inception could not be verified and has been dropped.
Structural Contradictions of the Technical Intern Training Program — Between 'International Contribution' and Labor Shortages
Updated the number of foreign workers, technical intern trainees, and specified skilled workers to the latest published figures.
Why we got it wrong All three had been updated since publication. The article gave rounded approximations, which have been replaced with the published counts.
Five Structural Reasons Why "Freedom to Transfer" Won't Work Under Japan's New Training and Employment Program — Is It Just Relabeling the Technical Intern System?
Moved the 2022 disappearance figure to the statistics that publish it.
Why we got it wrong The expert council page cited is a redirect stub returning 42 characters. The figure now points at the Immigration Services Agency's published statistics, with the rate against resident trainees added.
The Structure of Japan's Youth Mental Health Crisis — 340,000 School Refusals, Worst Youth Suicide Rate in the G7
Corrected the reasons given for school non-attendance to match the survey's current questions and options.
Why we got it wrong The 51.8% came from the survey's earlier answer options. The options have since changed, and the equivalent figure under the current categories is 32.2%.
The Structural Problem of Japan's Bicycle Blue Ticket System — Can Penalty Enforcement Be Justified When Only 3.6% of Cycling Space Is Separated Bikeway?
Removed the count of offence types and the road-length figures, and replaced the fine amounts with the schedule set out in the ordinance.
Why we got it wrong Neither the figure of about 113 offence types nor the road lengths (78,638 km, 475 km, 0.6%) could be confirmed in any source. The fine amounts are set out in the ordinance and have been taken from there.
The Structural Risks of Zero Food Tax — What a 5-Trillion-Yen 'Simple Solution' Obscures
Aligned the bottom-quintile figure with the 'about twice' wording the source uses.
Why we got it wrong The ¥59,000 is half of ¥118,000 and appears nowhere in the Daiwa report, which states only that the top quintile receives about twice the bottom quintile. The citation now points at the PDF.
The Four Layers of "Stealth Tax Increases" — How the End of Flat-Rate Cuts, Rising Social Insurance, the Invoice System, and Defense Surtax Erode Take-Home Pay
Moved the flat-rate tax cut to a document that carries the amounts and dropped an unverifiable premium increase.
Why we got it wrong The tax cut was cited to a landing page carrying no amounts; it now points at the National Tax Agency leaflet. The claim that a worker on ¥5 million paid about ¥200,000 more a year could not be checked: the Toyo Keizai article cited is an interview and is paywalled beyond its opening.
Structural Problems in Agriculture and Food Security——Reading the Meaning of 38% Self-Sufficiency
Updated the core-farmer and abandoned-farmland figures to MAFF's latest published statistics.
Why we got it wrong The 1.02 million workers, average age of 69.2 and 71.7% aged 65 or over match no year in MAFF's published series; the article now follows the ministry's basic data table. Both the structural survey page and the abandoned-farmland page cited were index pages carrying no figures. The farmland bank consolidation rate remains unchecked because that particular MAFF page refuses automated requests.
A 5-Million-Yen Salary in One Chart — Where ¥1.1M Goes, and How It Compares to 10 Years Ago
Removed the annual premium amounts from the payslip table and replaced them with the contribution rates the sources publish.
Why we got it wrong The annual amounts were calculated from an assumed salary of 5 million yen and do not appear in any source. What the sources publish are the rates.
'Fund Museums with Public Money' — What's at Stake in a Country Spending 0.02% of GDP on Culture
Corrected the cultural budget to the published figures and dropped the Louvre's percentage increase.
Why we got it wrong The ¥110 billion differs from the published figures and does not appear in the PDF cited; the text now follows the FY2026 budget overview. The Louvre's 38% increase could not be confirmed because the museum's site renders its prices in JavaScript.
The Silent Erosion of Disposable Income — How Inflation and Rising Social Insurance Premiums Are Squeezing Household Finances in 2026
Moved the consumer price citation to a document that carries the figures.
Why we got it wrong The citation was an index page carrying no figures; it now points at the national annual average PDF, with the overall rate added. The Teikoku Databank count of over 20,000 items remains unverified.
Why Japan Cannot Advance the Right to Disconnect — Three Structural Barriers: Legislation, Culture, and Enforcement
Split the figure on out-of-hours contact into the overall rate and the rate for men.
Why we got it wrong The figure for men had been presented as the overall figure. The source publishes both.
Three Decades of Wage Stagnation — The Structural Mechanisms Behind Japan's Plateau Since the 1997 Peak
Corrected the deflator paired with the real-wage figure, dropped two figures absent from their sources, and re-attributed the productivity-to-wage sensitivity to MHLW rather than the OECD.
Why we got it wrong The 1.3% real-wage decline is deflated by the consumer price index excluding imputed rent, which rose 3.7%; the 3.2% the article paired with it belongs to the all-items index, which yields a 0.8% decline. Two different indices had been combined. The OECD comparison (+38.7% for South Korea and so on) and the service-sector pass-through rates (about 30% against nearly 100% in the US) appear nowhere in the cited sources and could not be confirmed in the publishers' material, so both have been dropped; the international comparison is replaced with the one MHLW's white paper publishes on a 1996 = 100 basis. The statutory non-wage labour cost series has been dropped: the Keidanren page cited reports year-end bonus settlements, and the survey it would have come from ended in 2019. The 0.4% wage response to a 1% productivity gain comes from MHLW's white paper, not the OECD. The 5.25% wage settlement matches Rengo's summary, but the '33 years' framing describes the previous year, and the sentence has been rewritten accordingly.
Reported by Rengo 2025 Spring Struggle Summary; MHLW Monthly Labour Survey (preliminary, 2025); MHLW Analysis of the Labour Economy 2023
Three Decades of Wage Stagnation — The Structural Mechanisms Behind Japan's Plateau Since the 1997 Peak
Added the correlation coefficients the source gives for productivity and real wages.
Why we got it wrong The link was described only qualitatively, but the source states it as a correlation coefficient, which is now given.
The Structure of Gasoline Double Taxation — The 'Tax on Tax' Problem That Persists After Provisional Rate Abolition
Stopped presenting the ¥170 subsidy target as a figure from the price survey.
Why we got it wrong The ¥170 is the government's target for holding retail prices down, not a price published by the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy's survey. The survey is no longer cited for it.
The Structural Contradiction of the 1-Meter Overtaking Rule — Can 'Safe Clearance' Be Achieved on Roads Only 3.5 Meters Wide?
Removed five figures — bicycle commuters, cycling lane length, housing on narrow streets, cycling among over-60s, and Dutch cycle-path length — that could not be verified.
Why we got it wrong None of the five could be found in the sources cited, and no replacement source was found, so the figures have been dropped rather than re-attributed. Only the 7,570 km of cycling space, which is confirmed, remains.
How Much Is Japan's Child Support Levy? The Burden on Singles and Childless Households
Replaced the health insurance enrolment figures with the per-scheme counts the source publishes, and pointed the levy and single-person household figures at the underlying documents.
Why we got it wrong The 54 million figure for employment-based insurance is 77.36 million when the source's own rows are added up, a gap of more than 20 million. The source publishes enrolment by scheme, so the schemes are now listed separately. The 1 trillion yen levy and the single-person household count were correct; both had been cited to landing pages and now point to the documents themselves.
A 'Unification' That Isn't Unified — What the My Number Insurance Card Reveals About Japan's Digital Governance
Added the neighbouring age bands to the My Number health card usage rate.
Why we got it wrong Only the lowest band had been quoted. The source publishes the rate for each band, so the full gradient is now shown.
Structures Preserved in the Name of 'Women's Empowerment' — What the Revised Act Reveals About Japan's Gender Gap
Moved the gender pay gap citation to a document that carries the figure.
Why we got it wrong The citation was an index page carrying no figures; it now points at the summary PDF, with the wage levels for men and women added.
Why Did the Henoko Boat Capsize Kill Two? Okinawa's Base Burden and Structural Violence
Recorded that the referendum result and construction progress could not be matched to their sources.
Why we got it wrong Neither the 71.7% opposition figure nor the 6.6% construction progress appears in the retrieved text of the nippon.com and Akahata articles cited. The figures are widely reported, but the reason they remain unverified here is recorded in scripts/unverifiable-statrefs.json.
15 Years After 3/11, 2 Years After Noto — The Structural Limits of Japan's ¥41 Trillion Recovery
Corrected the population decline in affected municipalities, the population of the Oku-Noto area, and the number of evacuees.
Why we got it wrong The claim that nine in ten affected municipalities lost population was conflated with the national trend. The Oku-Noto figure came from a paywalled article where only the headline was readable, and has been replaced with a report carrying the same content. The evacuee count has been updated to the latest published figure.
The Day the Strait Closes — Japan's Structural Vulnerability in Energy Security
Corrected the volume through the Strait of Hormuz, Japan's Middle East dependence, and its oil stockpile, and removed the GDP estimate.
Why we got it wrong The volume and stockpile figures came from mismatched years, and the dependence rate is 94.7% or 95.2% depending on the year. The GDP estimate could not be confirmed and has been dropped.
The Day One Complaint Erased 2,100 Meals — The Iwaki Sekihan Disposal Incident and Structural Vulnerability in Public Administration
Added the cut-off time and the channels used for the roughly 200 complaints received by the city.
Why we got it wrong The three-day window does not appear in the source, which instead gives a cut-off time and the channels through which the complaints arrived.
The Structure Behind 38% Food Self-Sufficiency — Rethinking Food Security in an Age of Globalization
Corrected how the food self-sufficiency rate, the average age of core farmers, and food waste are presented.
Why we got it wrong The self-sufficiency rate varies widely with the basis used (38%, 46%, or 64%), yet only one figure was given. The article now shows the figures for each basis as the source presents them.
The Disconnect Between Higher Education and the Labor Market — The Talent Universities Produce vs. the Talent Society Demands
Updated the university and tertiary enrolment rates to the latest published figures, removed the claim that the rate was a record, and corrected the year label on the turnover rate.
Why we got it wrong MEXT revised the formula for calculating enrolment rates in its FY2025 release and recalculated earlier years. The 57.7% and 83.8% figures were on the old basis. On the new basis the rates are flat and falling respectively, so they cannot be described as a record. The 34.9% turnover figure is correct but tracks the cohort that graduated in March 2021 over three years, so the year label has been fixed.
When Children's Tables Break Down — The Triple Crisis of Free School Lunches, Solitary Eating, and Kodomo Shokudo
Removed the claim that 75% of parents in non-participating municipalities feared a drop in quality, and replaced it with the published data on free school meals.
Why we got it wrong The survey cited could not be located and the origin of the 75% figure could not be established, so it has been dropped in favour of figures that can be verified.
21 Million Non-Regular Workers — Has 'Equal Pay for Equal Work' Narrowed Japan's Employment Gap?
Moved the wage figures from an index page to the employment-type section and restored the published units.
Why we got it wrong The citation was an index page carrying no figures; it now points at the employment-type PDF. The ¥349,000 and ¥233,000 were roundings of the published ¥348.6 thousand and ¥233.1 thousand, now stated as published.
Renewable Energy and the Regional Economy — New Inequalities Born of the Energy Transition
Replaced the renewable share and FIT surcharge with published figures, and removed the 15% curtailment figure for Kyushu.
Why we got it wrong The 22.9% and 2.7 trillion yen figures were cited to the Energy White Paper's contents page, which carries no figures in its 1,293 characters. They have been replaced with the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy's subcommittee material and METI's surcharge announcement. The 15% curtailment figure does not appear on the Kyushu Electric page cited and could not be confirmed in METI materials, so it has been dropped.
Population Decline and the Concentration in Tokyo — Reading the Mechanics of Regional Disappearance Through Structure
Corrected the net inflow to Greater Tokyo and the population projection figures.
Why we got it wrong The 63 million figure was cited to a landing page with no figures on it, and the check had passed only because a candidate derived from 100 million matched the postcode in the page footer. The figure itself was right, so each value has been sourced to the document that carries it. The net inflow has been set to the published count.
The Economic Rationality of Preventive Medicine: Social Design in the Era of 48 Trillion Yen Healthcare Costs
Replaced the rounded per-capita medical costs by age with the published amounts.
Why we got it wrong Both figures were rounded so coarsely that they were more than 40,000 yen away from the published amounts.
Dismantling the '1.06 Million Yen Wall' — The Social Insurance Turning Point Facing 2 Million Workers
Moved the non-regular employment count to a document that carries the figure.
Why we got it wrong The page cited does not carry the 2024 average of 21.26 million; the citation now points at the summary PDF of the detailed tabulation, whose trend table does.
Can 'Kankeijinko' Solve the Sustainability Problem of Student Community Work?
Corrected the shares for young people's regional mobility.
Why we got it wrong The end-point figures were each about half a point off the source, and have been corrected.
Public Assistance 'Capture Rate' 20% — The Invisible Gaps in Japan's Safety Net
Corrected the household count to the published figure and moved the citation to the monthly release.
Why we got it wrong The 1.67 million differs from the published 1.65 million, and the PDF cited was an unrelated document on meal provision. The citation now points at the March 2024 provisional release. The 15–20% capture rate remains unverified because the repository page cited holds only bibliographic data.
Public Assistance 'Capture Rate' 20% — The Invisible Gaps in Japan's Safety Net
Replaced the 0.5% fraud rate for public assistance with the counts and amounts the source actually publishes.
Why we got it wrong The cited government material publishes the number of fraud cases and the amount involved, but not a rate. The article stated a rate without a denominator, so it has been replaced with the figures the source gives.
Financial Reality of Japan's NPO Sector — Structural Vulnerabilities Hidden Within a 'Donation Powerhouse'
Updated total individual donations and the number of certified NPOs to the published figures, and removed the unsupported claim that NPO staff earn 2.31 million yen on average.
Why we got it wrong The donation total was cited to the publisher's research index page, which carries no figures; the published total is 2.0261 trillion yen. The figure of 49,257 certified NPOs appears in no year of the official series, which gives 49,478 at the end of March 2025. The average NPO salary was cited to a National Tax Agency survey of private-sector wages that does not cover NPOs, and no survey publishing a per-person NPO average could be found, so the figure has been dropped in favour of the staff counts and total salary payments the Cabinet Office survey does publish.
Two Years Since the Act on Loneliness and Isolation — What Has the World's First Comprehensive Law Changed?
Replaced a loneliness share we had produced by adding three categories with the published breakdown, and moved the household projection to the press release.
Why we got it wrong The 39.3% was the sum of three Cabinet Office categories; the source states only 'about four in ten'. The article now gives the published shares. The household projection was cited to a table index page and now points at the press release, with the figures for women and the 23.30 million household count added.
Japan's Digital Platform Regulation — New Rules Drawn by the Transparency Act, Smartphone Act, and Information Platform Response Act
Recorded that the user count and the commission rate could not be matched to their sources.
Why we got it wrong The 97 million users is cited to the white paper's landing page, which holds only chapter links, and the 20% commission to a JFTC explanatory page carrying no figures. Both reasons are recorded in scripts/unverifiable-statrefs.json.
Japan's Digital Platform Regulation — New Rules Drawn by the Transparency Act, Smartphone Act, and Information Platform Response Act
Updated internet advertising spend to the latest year.
Why we got it wrong A more recent year has since been published, so both years are now shown.
Anthropic vs. The Pentagon — When AI Companies' Ethical Judgments Collide with National Security
Dropped a contract ceiling and a defence budget figure that could not be checked against their sources.
Why we got it wrong The $200 million ceiling does not appear in the Anthropic statement cited, and the Pentagon site refuses automated requests, so it has been dropped. The $1.8 billion AI budget and 40% increase were cited to the Pentagon's news index rather than any specific document. The UN General Assembly vote remains unchecked because the UN pages return a JavaScript challenge; the reason is recorded.
The Acceleration of Global Wealth Concentration — Top 0.001% Hold Three Times More Than Bottom 50%
Replaced the billionaire wealth totals with what the source actually states.
Why we got it wrong The $18.3 trillion, 16% and 81% figures do not appear on the Oxfam page cited; the text now follows what that page says.
Employment 'Quantity' Has Recovered, But What About 'Quality'? — Structural Challenges in Japan's Labor Market Revealed by Data
Corrected the non-regular employment share and moved the spring wage citation to a document that carries the figures.
Why we got it wrong The 37.2% belongs to a different table in the source (an employment rate for 2017); the published share for 2024 is 36.8%. The spring wage round was cited to Rengo's yearly index page, which carries no figures, and now points at the summary PDF.
What Is Google for Nonprofits? A Complete Guide to Free Google Tools for Nonprofits
Attributed the PMax video asset cap to its actual publisher.
- Before
- The citation was labelled "Performance Max 2026 Updates" while linking to a Strike Social blog post. The June 2025 Google blog post was cited under two different URLs within the same article.
- After
- The citation now names Strike Social as an advertising agency, the body notes that Google's own help pages do not state a video count, and the blog URL is normalised to the one it redirects to.
Why we got it wrong The source name read as an official Google announcement, but the link pointed to an advertising agency's blog. Neither Google Ads Help "About your Google Ads account limits" nor the Performance Max asset group page states a video limit per asset group. The figure was not removed, since the report itself exists — it is now attributed to whoever published it, with a note that it cannot be verified in Google's own documentation. The June 2025 blog citation was also consolidated onto the URL that the older path redirects to.
Your NPO Isn't Using Ad Grants? How to Access Up to $10,000/Month in Free Advertising
Replaced the source for the verification timeline with Google's official help page (the figure itself is unchanged).
- Before
- Source = Groas.ai, "Google Ad Grants Approved Guide" (2026)
- After
- Source = Google for Nonprofits Help, "Get verified by Goodstack"
Why we got it wrong Google's own help page states that most requests are reviewed within 3–5 business days, yet the article cited a third-party explainer instead. Where primary documentation exists, it should be cited. The figure matched the official statement, so no numeric change was needed.
A Fundraising Model for Social Enterprises Using Google for Nonprofits
Replaced the Ad Grants policy source link with a page whose content can still be verified.
- Before
- Source = Google Ad Grants Help (support.google.com/grants/answer/46029)
- After
- Source = Ad Grants Help, "Budget and bid limits" (support.google.com/grants/answer/1332166)
Why we got it wrong The previously cited page no longer exists as a standalone article and now redirects to Google's generic help index. Because it still returns HTTP 200, a link checker does not flag it — yet readers could not reach the cited material. The claim itself is unchanged.
How to Pass the Google for Nonprofits Review: Writing a Business Plan That Gets Approved
Corrected the Goodstack review period from 3–14 business days to 3–5 business days.
- Before
- The review typically takes 3–14 business days.
- After
- Most requests are reviewed within 3–5 business days. If additional documents or supplementary information are requested, the process takes longer.
Why we got it wrong The article conflated two separate steps: Goodstack's eligibility verification and Google for Nonprofits' own application review. Google's official help page states that most Goodstack requests are reviewed within 3–5 business days, while the Google for Nonprofits application review is documented as 2–14 business days.
How to Pass the Google for Nonprofits Review: Writing a Business Plan That Gets Approved
Added a note on how the eligibility rules apply to social welfare corporations that operate licensed nurseries.
- Before
- For-profit corporations, government agencies, hospitals, schools, and religious organizations are not eligible.
- After
- Added that where a social welfare corporation operating licensed nurseries falls on this line cannot be settled from published sources.
Why we got it wrong Google's help pages refer nurseries to Google for Education, yet nurseries are absent from the exclusion list in the eligibility requirements for Japan, and the Education eligibility criteria do not cover licensed nurseries either. The article did not address this discrepancy, leaving affected corporations unable to judge whether they could apply.
How to Get Google Workspace for Free as a Nonprofit
Corrected the paid-tier pricing to reflect annual-commitment rates and the per-edition discount levels.
- Before
- Business Standard costs approximately $3.50/user/month and Business Plus $6.16/user/month (both 75% off commercial pricing)
- After
- Business Standard costs $3.50/user/month and Business Plus $6.16/user/month on annual plans (75% and 72% off commercial pricing respectively)
Why we got it wrong The article did not distinguish annual-commitment pricing from monthly billing (monthly rates are $4.20 and $7.40). It also stated a flat 75% discount for every edition, whereas Google publishes 75% or more for Business Standard, 72% or more for Business Plus, and 70% or more for Enterprise. The Japanese edition of this article carried a further error: yen figures had been converted from USD at roughly 136 JPY rather than taken from Google's published yen pricing.
How to Get Google Workspace for Free as a Nonprofit
Corrected the compliance features, Enterprise storage, and free-tier user cap in the plan comparison diagram.
- Before
- Compliance showed Vault from Business Standard and Vault + DLP for Business Plus. Enterprise storage was listed as unlimited. The free tier showed a 2,000-user cap.
- After
- Vault is available from Business Plus, and DLP only on Enterprise. Enterprise storage is 5TB per user (more available on request). The free tier allows 300 users on new accounts, extendable to 2,000 on request.
Why we got it wrong The feature set and storage limits were written without checking Google's official pricing page. Vault is included from Business Plus upward and DLP only on Enterprise. The user cap also failed to reflect Google's own distinction between "up to 300 users on new accounts" and "up to 2,000 users on request."
How Ad Grants Gives Nonprofits Up to $10,000/Month in Free Search Advertising
Rewrote the application timeline as two verifiable stages instead of a single unsourced figure.
- Before
- The entire process typically takes 7–10 business days from start to active account. (Source = a Groas.ai explainer)
- After
- The Google for Nonprofits application is reviewed in 2–14 business days, and Ad Grants is activated separately once that approval comes through. (Source = Google for Nonprofits official help)
Why we got it wrong The "7–10 business days" figure came from a third-party explainer and could not be corroborated in Google's own documentation. The process actually runs in two stages — the Google for Nonprofits application review and the separate Ad Grants activation — and only the former has a published figure (2–14 business days). The unverifiable combined estimate was replaced with what the official source states.
What Is Google for Nonprofits? A Complete Guide to Free Google Tools for Nonprofits
Added a new section on social welfare corporations that operate licensed nurseries.
- Before
- The ineligible-organization list covered only government agencies, hospitals, schools, for-profit corporations, and religious organizations.
- After
- Added a section setting out the discrepancy between Google's own sources on how nurseries are treated, and how to read it.
Why we got it wrong The ineligibility list was based on only part of Google's official help content. A separate page states that schools, nurseries, academic institutions, and universities should refer to Google for Education, and the article did not address this discrepancy — leaving social welfare corporations that run nurseries unable to judge whether they could apply. Checking the referral destination showed that Google Workspace for Education defines qualifying institutions as primary schools, secondary schools, and degree-granting higher education institutions, which does not include licensed nurseries.
What Is Google for Nonprofits? A Complete Guide to Free Google Tools for Nonprofits
Replaced three source links that no longer resolve to the pages they cited.
- Before
- The CPC cap and Performance Max citations pointed to help pages that now redirect to a generic Google Help index; the negative keyword cap cited a third-party explainer.
- After
- The CPC cap now cites "Budget and bid limits," Performance Max cites the Google for Nonprofits community page, and the negative keyword cap cites Google Ads Help "About your Google Ads account limits."
Why we got it wrong Two of the cited help articles no longer exist as standalone pages and now redirect to Google's generic help index. Because they still return HTTP 200, a link checker does not flag them — yet readers could not reach the cited material. They were replaced with pages whose content can still be verified. The claim that Performance Max became "available to all Ad Grants accounts since January 2025" could not be corroborated in Google's published material, so the timing assertion was removed.
July 2026
Mental-Disorder Workers' Comp Awards Hit a Record 1,082 (FY2025): How Japan's Occupational Injury Shifted from Overwork Death to Psychological Strain
Fully updated the body, diagram, and statistics to the FY2025 data (released July 15, 2026).
- Before
- The body was a structural analysis based on FY2024 data (1,055 approved claims).
- After
- The body is updated to FY2025 (1,082 approved claims, a 28.2% recognition rate). By triggering event, customer harassment (127) and sexual harassment (127) drew level.
Why we got it wrong A provisional structural analysis based on FY2024 data was fully rewritten to match the latest published (FY2025) data. The FY2024 approved-claim count was revised to 1,056.
Mental-Disorder Workers' Comp Awards Hit a Record 1,082 (FY2025): How Japan's Occupational Injury Shifted from Overwork Death to Psychological Strain
Reflected the FY2025 data (released July 15, 2026) and changed the title from "Record 1,055" to "Pass 1,000 for the First Time (FY2024)."
- Before
- Mental-Disorder Workers' Comp Claims Hit a Record 1,055
- After
- In FY2025 mental-disorder work-injury awards rose to 1,082, a recognition rate of 28.2%; the FY2024 count was also revised to 1,056.
Why we got it wrong Three days before this article was published (July 18, 2026), the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare had released the FY2025 "Status of Work-Injury Compensation for Death from Overwork and the Like" (July 15, 2026), in which mental-disorder awards reached 1,082, already surpassing the FY2024 figure the article treats. The cause was a failure to check the latest release of a published statistic and presenting the older year's data as a record.
The Blind Spots of 'Free' Private High School Tuition: How Removing the Income Cap Widens Inequality
Removed "15% were in favor" from the economist survey. The figure does not appear in the cited source.
- Before
- 70% opposed raising the private high school support ceiling (15% were in favor).
- After
- 70% opposed raising the private high school support ceiling — 57% answering "disagree" plus those answering "strongly disagree".
Why we got it wrong On checking the source (the Japan Center for Economic Research economist survey), the breakdown of the 70% opposition is published, but the share in favour is not stated anywhere on the page. We removed the unsupported figure and replaced it with the breakdown we could verify.
The Blind Spots of 'Free' Private High School Tuition: How Removing the Income Cap Widens Inequality
Corrected the annual private high school learning cost and the share covered by the tuition support grant.
- Before
- Private high school annual learning cost ¥1,030,283 / the ¥457,200 ceiling covers 44% of the total
- After
- Private high school annual learning cost ¥1,179,261 / the ¥457,200 ceiling covers 39% of the total
Why we got it wrong MEXT revised the figures in its "FY2023 Survey on Children's Learning Costs" on 16 January 2026 (the document is marked "replaced 16 January 2026 due to numerical correction"). The private high school annual total changed from ¥1,030,283 to ¥1,179,261. Because we used the superseded figure, the coverage share was overstated as well.
Reported by Found while auditing every article citing this statistic, prompted by a reader's report on a related article.
What 'Tuition-Free' Doesn't Cover — The Education Gap Hidden by Japan's High School Tuition Subsidy
Updated the status of the amendment bill (from "aims for passage" to enacted on 31 March 2026, in force from April).
- Before
- Based on a tripartite agreement among the LDP, Nippon Ishin no Kai, and Komeito, the bill aims for passage within the fiscal year.
- After
- The bill passed the House of Councillors on 31 March 2026 and took effect in April.
Why we got it wrong The article was published just after the cabinet decision and never reflected the bill's subsequent passage. We updated it while verifying facts for the statistical correction.
What 'Tuition-Free' Doesn't Cover — The Education Gap Hidden by Japan's High School Tuition Subsidy
Corrected the three-year public-private learning cost gap from ¥1.29 million to ¥1.74 million.
- Before
- Private high school annual learning cost ¥1,030,283 / ~¥3.08 million over three years / gap ~¥1.29 million
- After
- Private high school annual learning cost ¥1,179,261 / ~¥3.52 million over three years / gap ~¥1.74 million
Why we got it wrong MEXT revised the figures in its "FY2023 Survey on Children's Learning Costs" on 16 January 2026 (the document is marked "replaced 16 January 2026 due to numerical correction"). The private high school annual total changed from ¥1,030,283 to ¥1,179,261, and the public figure from ¥597,752 to ¥596,954. This article was published on 20 March 2026 — two months after that revision. We failed to re-check a published statistic and used the superseded figures. We also added an explanation that these survey figures are net of the tuition support subsidy, and standardised the three-year totals on the survey's own grade-by-grade figures (Table 2), which had previously been mixed with a simpler annual-times-three calculation.
Reported by Brought to our attention by a reader. Thank you.