Fraud Losses in Japan Rose 98% in a Year While Cases Cleared Stood Still — Most Reports From People in Their 30s, Most Money From Those in Their 70s

Losses Nearly Doubled in a Single Year

In confirmed figures published on 22 May 2026, the National Police Agency put losses from remote-contact fraud in 2025 at 142.31 billion yen[1]. That is 70.43 billion more than the year before, a rise of 98.0%, close to double in a single year. Reported cases came to 27,832[1], up 32.3%.

Cases Cleared Did Not Move

Another figure sits alongside it in the same document. Cases cleared numbered 6,575, one fewer than the year before[1]. As a rate of change that is 0.0%. Persons arrested came to 2,338, up 2.8%. In the year losses rose by 70.43 billion yen, cases cleared fell by one.

It Has Been Climbing Since It Bottomed Out

This is not the story of a single year. Losses from remote-contact fraud fell from 40.77 billion yen in 2016 to 28.20 billion in 2021, then jumped in four years to 142.31 billion[2]. From that floor, five times over. Reported cases trace the same shape: impersonation fraud went from 2,272 cases in 2020 to 14,489[3], 6.4 times. There was a period when countermeasures worked and the numbers fell. Then a different shape rose in its place.

Only Impersonation Fraud Grew

The rise was concentrated in impersonation of a relative. Reported cases came to 14,489, up 114.6%[4], with losses of 113.81 billion yen, up 148.3%. Meanwhile the previously dominant methods fell: deposit-account fraud down 25.0%, refund fraud down 21.9%, cash-card theft by deception down 10.3%. The whole did not swell; one method jumped.

The Share of Older Victims Fell 14 Points

The statistics contain a second figure that unsettles an assumption: the share of older victims.

Across all remote-contact fraud, reported cases with victims aged 65 and over came to 14,273[4], up 3.9%. In absolute terms they rose. But as a share of reported cases excluding corporate victims they came to 51.3%[4], down 14.0 points. Older victims did not decline; everything else grew sharply. Measured by money, though, the picture changes: those aged 65 and over account for 59.2% of total losses[4], above their 51.3% of cases.

What Grew Was the 20s and 30s

Where it grew shows in the breakdown of impersonation fraud. The largest group by case count is those aged 80 and over, at 3,235, followed by people in their 70s at 2,453. So far, as before. Next, however, come people in their 30s at 2,284 cases[4], a rise of 329.3%, and those in their 20s at 1,759, up 361.7%. Together the two groups make up 27.9% of reported impersonation cases, a share 14.4 points higher than a year earlier.

Most Cases in the 30s, Most Money in the 70s

Carrying much of that is fake-police fraud, in which the caller claims to be an officer. Its largest group by case count is people in their 30s, at 2,239[4], followed by those in their 20s at 1,718. It is concentrated among the young.

Sort the same method by money lost, though, and the order inverts. The largest is people in their 70s at 27.46 billion yen[4], then those in their 60s at 25.63 billion. The ages at the top by count and the ages at the top by amount are entirely different.

The Loss per Case Differs Sharply by Age

The same thing can be checked by division, taking impersonation fraud by age with both counts and amounts. People in their 70s account for 2,453 cases and 31.46 billion yen; those 80 and over, 3,235 cases and 19.95 billion; those in their 30s, 2,284 cases and 9.07 billion; those in their 20s, 1,759 cases and 5.00 billion[4]. Per case that works out to about 12.83 million yen in the 70s, 6.17 million for those 80 and over, 3.97 million in the 30s, and 2.84 million in the 20s. One case in the 70s is 4.5 times one case in the 20s. That difference is why counting cases and counting money point to different ages.

The People Being Caught Are at the Bottom

First, who is being caught. Of the 2,338 persons arrested, 1,379, or 59.0%, were the couriers who collect the cash[4], unchanged from the year before. Meanwhile principal offenders arrested numbered 69, or 3.0%[4]. That is up 38.0% on the year, but from a small base. The people being caught are the ones sent to pick up the money.

The Bases Are Outside the Country

Why does it not reach higher? The agency's own document says part of it. Fifty-four people were arrested in connection with cases run from call bases abroad, in Thailand, Cambodia and elsewhere[4]. Recruiters advertise "easy money overseas," and those who travel are drawn into the offending. From people who had worked at such bases, the agency records statements: their passports and phones were taken; they were told to pay millions of yen if they wanted to leave; they were beaten when they did not follow instructions. The people placing the calls are themselves held, on the far side of a border. As long as an investigation stops at the national boundary, stacking up couriers will not reach the structure above them.

The Growth in Harm Has Come Loose From the Capacity to Catch It

The growth in harm has come loose from the capacity to catch it. While losses rose 98.0%, cases cleared moved 0.0%. In the same document, clearances for social-media investment and romance fraud rose 140.5% to 630, with persons arrested up 207.8% to 397. Investigative capacity is not flat across the board; it is flat in this one area. Where operations rotate disposable participants through short cycles, each cleared case reaches less far. The more the count is pursued, the further behind the growth in losses it falls.

Which Figure You Use Changes Where Resources Go

Then there is the question of which figure is taken as the basis. Measuring the same phenomenon by cases or by money sends the response to different places. By cases, warnings aimed at younger people take priority. By money, stopping the movement of older people's assets does. Fake-police fraud carries both at once: most cases in the 30s, most money in the 70s. Allocate resources on one of the two alone and the other falls through.

It Happens on a Screen, Not at a Counter

The awkward part is that the premise "this is a crime against the elderly" is built into how the countermeasures are made. Staff intervening at bank counters, neighbourhood watch, warnings passed to families. Each assumes a route that reaches an older person in person or by telephone. A method whose largest group is now in their 30s does not travel that route. The place where information asymmetry arises has moved from the counter to the phone screen.

This too can be checked against the figures. The most common route the money takes is bank transfer, at 16,894 cases and 82.30 billion yen[4], 60.7% of reported cases. Of those, transfers made through internet banking account for 6,866 cases and 49.53 billion yen, 60.2% of the money moved by transfer[4]. A route that passes neither a bank counter nor a cash machine is already where most of the money goes. Transfers into crypto-asset accounts add 628 cases and 8.03 billion yen, up 76.9% on the year. The money has stopped passing the places where someone could speak up.

Separate the Two Layers

As a matter of design, the two layers are better separated. The layer of counts is about closing the route of contact: giving people of every age a quick way to check whether a message claiming to be from the police is genuine. The layer of amounts is about stopping money just before it moves. Confirmation for large transfers and withdrawals is currently designed around older customers; if the threshold is an amount, age does not come into it.

Which indicator you cut the statistics with changes which problem you see. The same issue is taken up in designing outcome indicators（このサイトの記事）. How to turn public data into your own judgement is set out in reading official statistics in practice（このサイトの記事）. That losses doubled in a year when clearances did not move can be read now, without waiting for next year's figures.

Further Reading

• データリテラシー入門 : 日本の課題を読み解くスキル (Introduction to Data Literacy: Skills for Reading Japan's Problems)（外部サイト、新しいタブで開きます） (Akinori Tomohara, Iwanami Shoten). An introduction, built on Japanese social statistics, to how the same data yields different conclusions depending on how it is cut. It offers a way to spot the count-or-amount problem discussed above in other fields.

References

Reported and Cleared Cases of Remote-Contact Fraud and Social-Media Investment and Romance Fraud, 2025 (Confirmed Figures) — Organised Crime Department and Community Safety Planning Division, National Police Agency (2026). National Police Agency public information material

Reported and Cleared Cases of Remote-Contact Fraud and Social-Media Investment and Romance Fraud, 2024 — Organised Crime Department and Community Safety Planning Division, National Police Agency (2025). National Police Agency public information material

Reported and Cleared Cases of Remote-Contact Fraud — National Police Agency (2026). National Police Agency website, statistics

Remote-Contact Fraud: Current Situation — National Police Agency (2026). National Police Agency SOS47 anti-fraud pages