What Is Happening
It has been some time since EBPM (Evidence-Based Policy Making) was promoted in Japan. Since its inclusion in the Basic Policy on Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform (Honebuto Policy) in 2017, various ministries have been advancing institutional frameworks for EBPM promotion.
However, in actual policy formulation, cases continue to occur where available evidence is systematically ignored. "Data is insufficient," "Causal relationships have not been proven," "It is still premature"—these statements appear to be rational judgments based on scientific caution.
But from the perspective of "Strategic Ignorance" theorized by Linsey McGoey (2012), many of these statements function as rhetorical strategies to intentionally exclude inconvenient evidence. They are not unaware, but pretending not to know.
Background and Context
Theoretical Framework of Strategic Ignorance
McGoey (2012) critically reconstructed the economic concept of "Rational Ignorance" and presented the concept of "Strategic Ignorance."
Rational ignorance refers to the act of rationally choosing to "not know" when the cost of information gathering exceeds the benefits. This itself is economically justified. However, what McGoey problematized is the act of "pretending not to know information that is already known."
The tobacco industry's 40-year history of claiming health damage evidence was "insufficient" is a typical example of strategic ignorance. Proctor's (2008) agnotology originated precisely from this case.
Strategic Ignorance Patterns in Japan's EBPM
The following strategic ignorance patterns are observed in Japan's policy formulation processes:
| Pattern | Surface Reason | Strategic Function |
|---|---|---|
| "Insufficient Data" Logic | Small sample, short research period | Exclusion of inconvenient evidence |
| "Causality Unconfirmed" Logic | Correlation exists but not causation | Postponement of policy response |
| "Still Premature" Logic | More discussion needed | Justification of status quo bias |
| "Foreign Cases Don't Apply" Logic | Japanese context is unique | Blocking learning from precedents |
| "Inter-Ministry Coordination Needed" Logic | Cross-sectoral examination required | Responsibility diffusion and delay |
What these patterns have in common is that the issue is not the "absence" of evidence, but the "non-adoption" of evidence. Data does not not exist; rather, decisions are made—in seemingly rational ways—not to adopt existing data.
Positioning in Agnotology
Within Proctor's (2008) three types of ignorance (native ignorance, lost knowledge, strategically manufactured ignorance), strategic ignorance in EBPM precisely corresponds to the third type.
However, it is important to note that unlike the tobacco industry, a single actor is not intentionally producing ignorance. Strategic ignorance in Japan's EBPM promotion is rather a product of institutional and organizational incentive structures.
Specifically, the following structural factors are combined:
- Vertical ministry structure: Inhibits integration of cross-sectoral evidence
- Budget cycle inertia: Previous year-based budget compilation makes evidence-based resource allocation difficult
- Formalization of policy evaluation: EBPM promotion tends to be reduced to formal "Logic Model creation"
- Personnel rotation: With responsibility changing every 2-3 years, organizational memory of accumulated evidence is lost
Reading the Structure
Distinguishing Between "Not Knowing" and "Pretending Not to Know"
The most important aspect in analyzing strategic ignorance is distinguishing between "truly not knowing" and "knowing but pretending not to know."
This distinction is empirically difficult, but the following indicators provide clues:
- Evidence accessibility: Was the evidence publicly available and accessible to policy officials?
- Existence of prior discussions: Are there records of the evidence being discussed in deliberative councils, etc.?
- Selective citation: Is there a pattern of adopting some evidence while ignoring other evidence?
- Quality of counterarguments: What level do counterarguments like "insufficient data" specifically require? (Demanding endlessly high standards is a sign of strategic ignorance)
Loop Structure
Strategic ignorance is not a one-time judgment but forms a self-reinforcing loop. Evidence is ignored → Policy doesn't change → Problems continue → New evidence emerges → Ignored again—within this loop, "pretending not to know" becomes institutionalized.
What is more serious is that this loop can be positively evaluated from the outside as "careful policy management." Under the pretext of "avoiding hasty policy changes," strategic ignorance clothes itself in the garb of rationality.
Connection with Epistemic Injustice
The "structure where NPO voices don't reach" analyzed in Hypothesis 2 (epistemic injustice of NPOs) is closely linked with this strategic ignorance loop.
NPOs present field evidence → Discounted through testimonial injustice → Processed as "insufficient data" → Absorbed into the strategic ignorance loop. Epistemic injustice functions as an entry point into the strategic ignorance loop.
Possibilities for Resistance
Resistance to strategic ignorance is insufficient with merely presenting evidence (since the presented evidence is what is being ignored). What is needed is meta-level intervention such as the following:
- Visualization of ignorance patterns: Systematically record and publish which evidence was excluded, for what reasons, at which stages
- Clarification of "insufficient data" standards: Define in advance the level of evidence necessary for policy judgment to prevent arbitrary raising of standards
- Third-party policy evaluation: Monitoring of evidence utilization by independent institutions rather than self-evaluation by ministries
- Institutionalization of organizational memory: Development of knowledge management systems to prevent evidence loss due to personnel rotation
Questions for Our Research Lab
- In Japan's EBPM promotion, in which policy areas and to what extent does strategic ignorance occur systematically?
- What are the criteria for distinguishing whether counterarguments like "insufficient data" correspond to rational caution or strategic ignorance?
- What are the institutional design principles for breaking the strategic ignorance loop?
- What strategies can enhance the effectiveness of evidence presentation by NPOs?
References
Strategic unknowns: towards a sociology of ignorance
McGoey, L.. Economy and Society, 41(1), 1-16
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Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance
Proctor, R. N. & Schiebinger, L.. Stanford University Press
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Post-Truth
McIntyre, L.. MIT Press
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無知学への招待 — 未知・無知・不可知の人文学
鶴田想人. 明石書店
Read source